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NOTES 
The Role of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
Under the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act 
of 1974 
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act, of 19741 is 
the first major change in federal regulation of futures markets since 
1936.2 The Act attempts to fill the need for federal regulation created 
by the enormous growth in size and importance of the futures mar-
kets. Its central feature is the creation of an independent commis-
sion to monitor the 500 billion dollars per year futures trading 
markets.8 
The Act does not resolve all of the important issues raised in the 
recent congressional hearings on futures markets. Instead, the Con-
gress explicitly chose to leave the resolution of several controversial 
issues to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (Commis-
sion). 4 On the surface, this delegation of authority to the Commission 
seems sound. There is a danger, however, that the Commission's hear-
ings, like those of the Congress, will attract primarily those with vested 
interests in particular solutions. The Commission must take affirma-
tive action to seek out diverse views, and, if necessary, undertake its 
own investigations; othenvise its decisions will necessarily be based 
on the same industry information that was presented to Congress. 
This would frustrate the avowed purpose of the Act to create a 
federal apparatus that can weigh all interests objectively.'1 
After a brief look at the functions of futures markets, the con-
ditions that led to the enactment of the Commodity Futures 
.Trading Commission Act, and the major provisions of the Act, this 
note will critically examine the information now available on the 
major issues left to the Commission to decide, point to additional 
information that would be useful in making judgments on these 
issues, and recommend solutions. It will then discuss two prob-
lems not considered in the 1974 legislation-export controls and 
margin oversight-suggesting areas for action by the Commission. 
1. Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389. 
2. In 1936 the original federal legislation regulating commodity futures, the Grain 
Futures Act of 1922, Pub. L. No. 67-331, 42 Stat. 998, was significantly strengthened 
by amendments, and renamed the Commodity Exchange Act. Pub. L. No. 76-675, 49 
Stat. 1491. 
3. See 120 CONG. Rile. Hl0,247 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1974); 120 CoNG. R.Ec. SIS,864 
(daily ed. Oct. 10, 1974). 
4. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 93--463, §§ 203, 208, 402(b), 414, 416, 88 Stat. 1396, 1400-01, 
1412, 1414-15. 
5. 120 CONG. R.Ec. SlS,864 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1974). 
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I. FUNCTIONS OF FUTURES MARKETS 
A futures contract6 is a standardized agreement to purchase or sell 
a fixed amount of a commodity7 of a certain grade8 at a certain 
future date9 for a variable price.10 Several delivery months are estab-
lished for each type of future traded.11 The number of commodities 
in which contracts are traded has increased steadily.12 The 1974 Act 
6. For an excellent discussion of the nature of a futures contract, see R. TEWELES, 
C. HARr.ow & H. STONE, THE COMMODITY FUTURES GAME 22-24 (1974). 
7. The term "commodity'' will be used here to signify all of the commodities 
named in the 1974 Act, and all other goods, articles, services, rights, and interests in 
which futures contracts ~ presently or may in the future be traded. 
8. The contract specifies a certain basis grade. The seller may choose to deliver 
a grade other than the basis grade. If he does, the quoted price will be adjusted by 
either a premium or a discount. J. BAER &: 0. SAXON, COMMODITY EXCHANGES AND 
FUTURES TRADING 135 (1949). 
9. Contracts on the physical market, generally known as the cash market, may 
also provides simply for future delivery. Futures trading on the physical market, how-
ever, contemplates actual delivery of a specific lot and grade of some commodity, usu-
ally on a definite date. G. HOFFMAN, FUTURES TRADING Ul'ON ORGANIZED COMMODITY MAR-
KEi'$ IN THE UNITED STATES 104-10 (1932). 
IO. See Com Prods. Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 47 n.1 (1955). One 
writer has pointed to five distinctive features of a futures contract. First, the specific 
provisions of each contract are determined by the rules of an exchange and are only 
briefly referred to in the actual agreement between the parties. Second, the contract is 
a "basis contract," which allows delivery of either the "contract grade" or some other 
grade, at the seller's option but at different prices. Third, the seller is given the 
option of making delivery at any date between specified limits. Fourth, the enforce-
ment of the contract is ensured by a provision that a specified amount, known as a 
margin, shall be deposited with some _third party by each of the contracting parties. 
These deposits are intended to protect the seller against a refusal of the buyer to 
make good his contract in case of a fall in prices, and, conversely, to protect the 
buyer against a default on the seller's part in case of a rise in prices. Fifth, delivery 
is made by tendering warehouse receipts from an approved warehouse. C. HARDY, 
RisK AND RlsK-BEARING 204-05 (2d ed. 1931). 
U. Delivery may be made at the seller's option on any day of the delivery month. 
J. BAER&: 0. SAXON, supra note 8, at 141. The delivery must be made from an ap• 
proved storage facility. Id. at 142. There are three bases for the selection of months: 
natural (by climate, annual harvest, or production schedule), concentration of trading 
volume, and inertia. T. HIERONYMUS, ECONOMICS OF FUTURES TRADING 37 (1971). 
12. At least 56 new contracts were established by American commodity exchanges 
between 1960 and 1970, ranging from futures in frozen concentrated orange juice to 
futures in propane gas. See Sandor, Innovation by an Exchange: A Case Study of the 
Development of the Plywood Futures Contract, 16 J. LAW & EcoN. 119, 122-23 (1973). 
Following the legalization of the holding of gold by private American citizens, four 
major American commodity exchanges began trading in gold futures contracts, with 
varying contract units. N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1974, § 6, at 2, col. 3 (late city ed.). 
There has been serious dispute as to what goods, services, or other tangible or 
intangible things should be traded on futures markets. See Sandor, supra, at 125-26. 
See also J. BAER & O. SAXON, supra note 8, at 110-25; Bakken, Futures Trading-
Origin, Development and Economic Status, in 3 FUTURES TRADING SEMINAR: A CoM-
MODITY MARKETING FORUM FOR COLLEGE TEACHERS OF ECONOMICS (E. Gaumnitz ed. 
1966) [hereinafter FUTURES TRADING SEMINAR]; Houthakker, The Scope and Limits of 
Futures Trading, in THE Au.oCATION OF ECONOMIC R.EsoURCES 134 (1959); Powers, 
Effects of Contract Provisions on the Success of a Futures Contract, 49 J. FARM EcoN. 
833 (1967). Some recently have taken the view that anything that fluctuates in price 
may properly be the subject of a futures contract. lntervi~IT with Shirley Z. Johnson, 
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extends regulatory authority to any goods and articles and all 
services, rights, and interests in which contracts for future delivery 
are traded now or will be traded in the future.13 
Futures contracts may be settled either by delivery of the actual 
good or by making an offsetting transaction any time before the 
delivery date. If delivery is made and taken, title passes and the 
buyers and sellers liquidate their positions.14 In practice, however, 
about ninety-nine per cent of futures contracts are settled by off-
setting transactions,15 in which the holder of a contract to sell liqui-
dates his position by purchasing a contract to buy the same com-
modity, or the holder of a contract to buy cancels his position by 
acquiring a contract to sell. To illustrate, if a trader who has al-
ready bought five October soybeans futures contracts sells five 
October soybeans futures contracts before October, the second trans-
action is matched against the first and the value difference between 
the two contracts is settled.16 
Futures contracts are bought and sold on exchanges.17 Trading at 
Assistant Counsel, Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcomm., Washington, D.C., 
August 16, 1974 (memorandum of interview on file with the Michigan Law Review) 
[hereinafter Johnson Interview]. 
13. Pub. L. No. 93-463, § 20l(b), 88 Stat. 1395. 
14. See T. HIERONYMUS, supra note 11, at 38; Campbell, Trading on Futures Under 
the Commodity Exchange Act, 26 GEO, WASH, L REv. 215, 217 (1958). 
15. United States v. New York Coffee &: Sugar Exch., 263 U.S. 611, 616 (1924); 
Chicago Bd. of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1 (1924); J. BAER&: O. SAXON, supra note 8, at 138; 
G. HOFFMAN, FUTURE TRADING AND THE CASH-GRAIN MARKETS 7 (U.S. Dept. of Agri• 
culture Circular No. 201, 1932); Hoffman, Governmental Regulation of Exchanges, 
ANNAI.5 OF THE .AM. ACAD. OF PoL. &: Soc. SCI., May 1931, pt. 1, at 43-48; Invin, Legal 
Status of Trading in Futures, 32 !LL. L. R.Ev. 155, 156-57 (1937); Taylor, Trading in 
Commodity Futures-A New Standard of Legality?, 43 YALE L.J. 63, 89 (1933). 
16. As a further example, suppose A buys 1000 bushels of wheat in January for 
delivery in March at $2.20 a bushel. A's broker makes the offer on an exchange and 
it is accepted by B's broker, who bas an order from B to sell 1000 bushels of wheat 
for March delivery. To facilitate trading, the clearing house now becomes the oppo-
site party to both A and B. Assume that in February the price of March wheat 
futures contracts has risen to $2.30 a bushel. A decides to settle his contract, and 
therefore contracts on the exchange to sell 1000 bushels of March wheat to C. The 
clearing house, seeing that this transaction places A. in the position of having con-
tracted both to buy and to sell 1000 bushels of wheat for March delivery, cancels the 
two contracts. Since A contracted to buy the wheat at a price 10 cents per bushel 
lower than the price at which he agreed to sell, the clearing house will pay him $100. 
See J. BAER &: O. SAXON, supra note 8, at 164-96; T. HIERONYMUS, supra note 11, at 
39-44 • .Although most futures contracts are liquidated without delivery, the fact that 
deliveries can be made and taken is important in establishing and maintaining a 
relationship between cash and futures prices. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. Olsen, 
262 U.S. 1, 38 (1923); T. HIERONYMUS, supra, at 38-39. 
17. For a general description of exchange operations, see J. BAER &: 0. SAXON, 
supra note 8, at 143-64; T. HmRoNYMUs, supra note 11, at 10-27, Recently established 
futures exchanges are organized under Membership Corporation Laws, while the 
older exchanges were organized as corporations by special acts of state legislatures. 
Id. at 266. It has been held that an exchange is essentially a voluntary association, 
People v. Chicago Bd. of Trade, 80 IlL 134, 137 (1875). A.ccord, Turner v. Chicago 
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most exchanges is carried on in a large room or hall in which there are 
usually pits for each commodity traded. Speculators deal through 
futures commission merchants (FCM's), who act as intermediaries 
benV"een the broker on the exchange floor and the customer.18 The 
agreement between an FCM and his customer gives him limited 
power of attorney for the execution of orders and imposes certain 
conditions on the customer.19 A trader who has agreed to purchase 
is said to be long; a trader who has agreed to sell is said to be short.20 
Exchange rules usually require that information about a trans-
action be reported to the exchange clearing house at some time 
during the day that the transaction is made. After the trade is 
made on the floor, the FCM deals exclusively with a clearing mem-
ber or with the clearing house, if the FCM is a clearing member.21 
The clearing house is thus a party to all trades; it serves as a buyer 
to all sellers and a seller to all buyers.22 Each day the clearing house 
announces the settlement price from that day's trading for each 
contract traded.23 This figure serves as the basis for determining 
the amount to be collected or disbursed by the clearing house in 
settling that day's transactions.24 
One student of the exchanges has categorized traders into four 
somewhat distinct groups, according to their trading functions.25 
Bd. of Trade, 244 Fed. 108 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 245 U.S. 667 (1917); Thomson 
v. Thomson, 293 m. 584, 127 N.E. 882 (1920). 
18. A futures commission merchant (FCM) is an individual, association, partner-
ship, corporation, or trust "engaged in soliciting or in accepting orders for the pur-
chase or sale of any commodity for future delivery on, or subject to the rules of, 
any contract market." U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, FEDERAL REGULATION OF TRADING 
IN COMMODITY FUTURES CoNTRAcrs 44 (1973). 
19. For a description of the terms of agreements between brokers and customers, 
see T. HmRONY.Mus, supra note 11, at 53-54. For a discussion of the legal relationship 
between brokers and customers, see G. HOFF.MAN, supra note 15, at 165-66. Hiero-
nymus identifies four general kinds of services provided to customers by brokerage 
houses. First, they offer the best order execution possible, through good communi-
cations with skilled brokers on the exchange floors. Second, they act as the customer's 
agent with the clearing house and prepare accounts for him of his profits and losses. 
Third, they provide information for customers on market conditions and trends. 
Fourth, they furnish account executives who act as a personal contact for each 
customer. For a more detailed discussion, see T. HmRONY.MUS, supra, at 54-57. 
20. See T. HmRONY.MUS, supra note 11, at 39-40; Campbell, supra note 14, at 216-
18. 
21. Clearing houses reconcile all futures contracts and assure the financial integrity 
of futures transactions. For a detailed discussion, see J. BAER &: 0. SAXON, supra note 
8, at 164-87; T. HIERONYMUS, supra note 11, at 40-44. 
22. Courts have upheld the legality of the clearing system in Clews v. Jamieson, 
182 U.S. 461 (1901); Daniel v. Chicago Bd. of Trade, 164 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1947); and 
Crowley v. Commodity Exch., 141 F.2d 182 (2d Cir. 1944). 
23. The settlement price is based on the day's closing price or on closing price 
ranges for each month of each contract. T. HmRONY.MUs, supra note 11, at 42. 
24. Id. 
25, Id. at 44-51. See also J. BAER &: O. SAXoN, supra note 8, at 132; G. HOFF.MAN, 
supra note 15, at 133-34, -
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Floor brokers execute the orders they receive from their outside 
clients and from floor traders.26 They are currently permitted to 
trade for their mm accounts as well as for the accounts of their 
customers.27 Floor traders are professional speculators who trade for 
their own accounts in more than one commodity and who usually 
hold a large number of contracts. Under current regulations floor 
traders can also serve as floor brokers. Scalpers normally operate 
only in one pit; they attempt to take advantage of small, short-term 
price changes by buying at slightly lower and seeking to sell at 
slightly higher than the last quoted prices. Finally, pit traders profit 
from price changes that occur during the trading day, buying when 
they think the price is going up and selling when they think it is 
going dmm. 
It is generally believed that the central function of commodities 
markets is to provide a means for producers, dealers, and processors 
of various commodities to ensure against large price fluctuations.28 
This process, called hedging, allows "collectors and exporters of 
grain or other products, and manufacturers who make contracts in 
advance for the sale of their goods, to secure themselves against the 
fluctuations of the market by counter contracts, for the purchase or 
sale, as the case may be, of an equal quantity of the product, or of 
the material of manufacture."29 By reducing the risk of loss from 
a drop in value of the commodity, hedging enables producers to sell 
at lower profit margins. Middlemen require less capital and can 
carry a smaller inventory when assured of predictable costs for raw 
materials.3° Consumers benefit because the reduction in the pro-
26. A floor broker is any person "in or surrounding any pit, ring, post, or other 
place provided by a contract market for the meeting of persons similarly engaged, 
who shall purchase or sell for any other person any commodity for future delivery 
on, or subject to the rules of any contract market." U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, supra 
note 18, at 44. 
27. Id. 
28. See J. BAER & 0. SAXON, supra note 8, at 197. But see Bakken, supra note 12, 
at 15. 
29. Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236, 249 (1905). There 
is considerable disagreement as to what precisely constitutes hedging. See, e.g., Com 
Prods. Refining Co. v. Benson, 232 F.2d 554, 563 (2d Cir. 1956); J. BAER & G. WOOD• 
RUFF, COMMODITY ExCHANGES 83-121 (3d ed. 1935); BOARD OF TRADE OF THE Cmr OF 
CmCAGO, INTRODUCTION TO HEDGING 3-13 (1972); H. EMERY, SPECULATION ON THE STOCK 
AND PRODUCE ExCHANGES OF THE UNITED STATES 159-70 (1896); C. HARDY, supra note 
IO, at 71, 222, 226; G. HOFFMAN, supra, note 15, at 22; G. HOFFMAN, HEDGING BY DEAL-
ING IN GRAIN FUTURES 33-93, 114, 123-24 (1925); L. HOWELL, ANALYSIS OF HEDGING AND 
OTHER OPERATIONS IN GRAIN FUTURES 3 (U.S. Dept. of Agriculture Technical Dull. No, 
971, 1948); l\!ERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH, THE HEDGER'S HANDBOOK 5-10 
(1971); 1 REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ON THE GRAIN TRADE 207, 210 (1920) 
[hereinafter FTC REPORT]; 7 id., at 33, 53-54 (1926); Gray, The Importance of Hedging 
in Futures Trading and the Effectiveness of Futures Trading for Hedging, in 1 FUTURES 
TRADING SEMINAR, supra note 12, at 61-70; Hardy & Lyon, The Theory of Hedging, 51 
J. POL. ECON. 276, 287 (1923). 
llO. Banks encourage producers and middlemen to hedge. They will usually extend 
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ducer's and middleman's operating costs lowers the price of the 
finished product.81 As commodity producers and processors have 
become more sophisticated, they have made increasing use of 
hedging.82 
Although the value of hedging is generally accepted, speculation 
in futures has been sharply attacked.88 Speculators are regarded as 
suspect because they generally have no actual . business use for the 
physical commodities in which they purchase futures contracts. 
Rather, their profit or loss is made or suffered entirely from fluctua-
tions in futures prices. Some speculation, however, is essential to 
provide the market liquidity that enables markets to accommodate 
bona fide hedging transactions.84 Through the market mechanism 
speculators assume the risk of price movement from hedgers. Spec-
ulators are needed to perform this function because there is often 
an imbalance between the short and long hedgers. Some believe 
that speculation also plays a role in stabilizing commodity prices.85 
The traditional explanation is that speculators become expert at 
predicting the factors that are likely to affect prices and help to 
bring about more gradual price changes.86 
credit for a higher percentage of the value of goods pledged as security if they have 
been hedged on a futures market. J. BAER&: 0. SAXON, supra note 8, at 212; T. HIERO• 
NYI\IUS, supra note 11, at 131. 
31. Wolff, Comparative Federal Regulation of the Commodities Exchanges and 
the National Securities Exchanges, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 227 (1969); Note, Federal 
Regulation of Commodity Futures Trading, 60 YALE L.J. 822, 827 (1951). 
32. On the importance of hedging, see Gray, supra note 29, at 61-70. Teweles, 
Harlow and Stone point out that the assumption that hedging will eliminate all 
risk from price movements is naive. In practice, hedging is likely only to reduce 
risks, and many hedgers are in fact engaging in some speculation by means of their 
hedging position. R. T.EWELES, C. HARLOW & H. SroNE, supra note 6, at 32-43. 
33. See Campbell, supra note 14, at 219 n.17. See also J. BAER&: 0. SAXON, supra 
note 8, at 51-85; T. HIERONYMUS, supra note 11, at 136-46. Speculators are prevalent 
in the futures markets. A United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
study of international commodities futures markets found that "much of the sharp 
increase in the volume of trading since 1970-1972 has been in the form of specu-
lation." w. l.ABYS, :MARKETING AND DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS FOR PRIMARY COMMODITIES 
1l 8 (1974) (study prepared at the request of the UNCTAD secretariat) [hereinafter 
UNCTAD SruDY]. See also id. 1l 18. 
34. J. BAER&: 0. SAXON, supra note 8, at 73-'75. 
35. See generally A. BRACE, THE VALUE OF ORGANIZED SPECULATION 54-59 (1913); 
7 FTC REPORT, supra note 29, at 16-18; Note, supra note 31, at 828. Baer and Saxon 
report that in Board of Trade v. Clyne, 260 U.S. 704 (1922), 22 prominent economists 
filed affidavits in which each "declared his belief that, with infrequent and minor 
exceptions, futures trading had a marked tendency to stabilize prices." J. BAER &: 
O. SAXON, supra note 8, at 69 n.10. See also R. TEWELES, C. HARLOW & H. SroNE, 
supra note 6, at 14, 45-51. But see UNCTAD STullY, supra note 33, 1l 25. 
36. Because many speculators are not experts, the validity of this theory is now 
being questioned. See CoMMODITY EXCHANGE AUTHORITY, TRADING IN COMMODITY Fu-
TURES CoNTRAcrs ON THE CmCAGO BOARD OF TRADE 8-10 (Marketing Research Report 
No. 999, 1973). See also UNCTAD STullY, supra note 33, ,I1[ 26-35. 
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IJ. PRESENT CONDITIONS ON FUTURES MARKETS 
Congressional interest in futures markets has been spurred by 
their dramatic growth in recent years.87 In 1973, a time that com-
bined severe commodity shortages with widespread inflation, the per-
formance of futures markets became especially controversial.38 Since 
the early 1950's, there had been constant commodity surpluses and 
stable domestic prices.89 In 1973, increases in world population, per 
capita income, and food consumption combined with heavy infla-
tion, dollar devaluation, and adverse weather conditions in a number 
of growing areas to end the "age of surpluses."40 In this difficult 
period the pressures on futures markets both to reflect accurately 
the market situation and to moderate price instability were intense.41 
The markets reacted with what one advisory service character-
ized as "mob hysteria,"42 spawning what was called "the greatest 
bull market in history."43 The sudden increase in market volume 
and price levels was staggering. The 25.8 million futures contracts 
traded in 1973 represented a forty per cent increase over the volume 
in 1972, the previous record year.44 Price levels in some contracts 
soared to levels almost three times higher than their previous all-
time highs.45 
This major increase in price levels stimulated widespread con-
cern about the functioning of the markets. Critics suggested that 
speculators had bid up price levels, thereby exerting upward pres-
sure on consumer prices.46 Exchange spokesmen insisted instead that 
37. It is estimated that in 1960, 8.168 million futures contracts were traded, in-
volving a total value of $54.7 billion. By 1972, this figure had increased to 47.009 
million contracts, with a value of $399.3 billion. In 1973 the estimated value of 
contracts traded jumped even more dramatically to $520 billion. Association of 
Commodity Exchange Firms, Inc., Association Bulletins Nos. 1126, 1127, 1304. See 
also Hearings on S. 2485 Before the Senate Comm. on Agrfodture and Forestry, 93d 
Cong., 2d Sess. 540, 543-46 (1974) [hereinafter 1974 Senate Hearings]. 
38. Compare 119 CONG. R.Ec. H8,775 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1972) and 119 CONG. R.Ec. 
SIS,964 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1973) and Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Small Busi-
ness Problems of the House Permanent Select Comm. on Small Business, 93d Cong., 
1st Sess. 47 (1973) [hereinafter House Small Business Hearings], with id. at 133, 311. 
39. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1973, at 57, col. 5 Qate city ed.). 
40. TIME, April 2, 1973, at 84-85, quoting Richard Mayer, Chicago Board of 
Trade pit trader. See House Small Business Hearings, supra note 38, at 89-91; N,Y, 
Times, Oct. 15, 1973, at 57, col. 5 Qate city ed.). 
41. See generally Mollenhof, Risser 8: Anthan, The High Cost of Food Gambling, 
THE NATION, June 25, 1973, at 813. 
42. MONEY, Aug. 1973, at 28-29, quoting Commodity Chart Service, June 1973 
Letter. 
43. Bus. WEEK, Dec. 22, 1973, at 118, quoting Houston A. Cox, Jr., National Com-
modities Director, Reynolds Securities, Inc. 
44. Hearings on H.R. 11955 Before the House Comm. on Agriculture, 93d Cong., 
2d Sess. 265 (1974) [hereinafter 1974 House Hearings]. 
45. See Bus. WEEK, Dec. 22, 1973, at 118. 
46. See Mollenhof, Risser &: Anthan, supra note 41; N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1973, at 
47, coL 5 Qate city ed.), 
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an "extraordinary coincidence of global events" was the root cause.47 
The increased volatility of commodities prices caused commercial 
hedgers unexpected losses,48 while it simultaneously attracted in-
creased numbers of speculators who were encouraged by investment 
houses anxious to replace their faltering securities business.49 
The surge in futures prices led some to question the continued 
viability of the markets.50 There was "a kind of erosion of faith in 
the system by people who [had] used it for years,"51 and some 
felt that the futures markets were "anachronisms on their way 
to extinction."52 In contrast, exchange offidals argued that futures 
markets helped to hold down commodity price levels at a time of 
extraordinary pressure, and that speculation in fact had a dampening 
influence on futures price levels.53 
The disparity between the critics' charges and the claims of the 
exchanges led to congressional investigations. A House subcom-
mittee investigating the speculative boom concluded that the pattern 
of self-regulation by the exchanges coupled with oversight by a small 
federal regulatory agency was outmoded.64 They recommended the 
creation of "a Securities and Exchange Commission-type indepen-
dent regulatory agency with sufficient stature to attract good per-
sonnel and more authority • . . .''55 The House Agriculture Com-
mittee found a "crisis" of public confidence in the present regulatory 
scheme. 66 and a special subcommittee was set up to draft a compre-
hensive legislative proposal.67 Several Senators also introduced 
broad-ranging futures legislation.58 From the hearings and pro-
47. See House Small Business Hearings, supra note 38, at 135. 
48. In volatile markets swift price changes make it difficult to arrange a hedging 
transaction before the price moves. 
49. See FORBES, Aug. 1, 1978, at 24. 
50. See generally Mollenhof, Risser &: Anthan, supra note 41; Hearings on the 
Review of the Commodity Exchange Act Before the House Comm. on Agriculture, 
93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) [hereinafter 1973 House Hearings]. 
51. 119 CONG, REc. Sl7,'132-34 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1973), quoting Washington Star-
News, Sept. 25, 1973. 
52. 119 CONG. REc. S23,512-13 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1973), quoting Des Moines Sun-
day Register, March 4, 1973, quoting Walter Groeppinger; President of the National 
Com Growers Association. Other critics of futures markets stated they "serve only 
as gambling casinos with farm products as the chips," N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1973, at 
58, col. I (late city ed.), while the President of the National Consumers Congress 
charged that "consumers are getting the short end of the stick, because the exchanges 
do nothing but serve big agri-businesses." Wall St. J., Jan. 11, 1974, at 15, col. 5 
(midwest ed.). 
53. See House Small Business Hearings, supra note 38, at 133-43, 209-15. 
54. 114 CONG. REc. H8,776 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1973). 
55. Id. 
56. H.R. REP. No. 93-975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1974). 
57. 120 Cong. Rec. Hl0,247 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1974). The proposal introduced 
became H.R. 13113, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). 
58. See S. 2837, S, 2578, S. 2485, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). 
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posals emerged the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act 
of 1974. 
III. MAJOR PROVISIONS oF THE 1974 Acr 
Until passage of the 1974 Act, federal regulation of futures 
markets was governed by the 1936 Commodity Exchange Act.60 
Although it established a form of federal supervision over the e~-
changes, the 1936 Act provided little federal control over essential 
exchange functions.60 The 1974 Act finally establishes effective 
federal regulatory authority; much of its strength lies in the four 
provisions discussed below. 
A. Independent Agency 
The Act creates an independent regulatory agency-the Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission-headed by five commissioners 
to be appointed by the President ·with the advice and consent of the 
Senate.61 The Commission assumes the regulatory responsibility 
currently held by a division of the Department of Agriculture, and 
is intended to be more expert, more prestigious, and less susceptible 
to political pressure than the old body. It should also be more 
effective because its mandate extends to a wider range of goods and 
services and it is better able to determine the public interest.62 
The previous regulatory system within the Department of Agri-
culture was inadequate largely because the Department was bur-
dened with other duties. For example, the Secretary of Agriculture 
was charged with influencing the prices of many commodities.68 
Since prices are supposed to fluctuate freely with supply and demand 
on the commodities markets, his duty to maintain price levels cre-
ated a potential conflict of interest with his duty to oversee the 
markets.64 There was also a conflict between the Department's role 
as an advocate for agricultural interests and its neutral position as 
the supervisor of futures trading. The independence of the new 
Commission should enable it to avoid such conflicts. 
59. Pub. L. No. 74:-675, 49 Stat 1491. 
60. See Carey, Regulation and Supervision of Futures Trading, in 3 FUTURES TRAD• 
ING SEMINAR, supra note 12, at 139, 146. 
61. Pub. L. No. 93-463, §§ 101-06, 88 Stat 1389-95. The Commissioners arc to be 
full-time employees of the Commission, and they arc not to accept compensation from 
any person subject to regulation by the Commission. Four of the initial Commissioners 
have been nominated and confirmed. N.Y. Times, April 20, 1975, § 3 (Business and 
Finance), at 1, col. 4. 
62. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 93-975, supra note 56, at 42-53; H.R. REP. No. 93-438, 
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 40-42 (1974); S. REP. No. 93-1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 20-22 (1974). 
63. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 601-24, 1281-1393, 1421-68 (1970), 
64. See 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 198, 417, 572, 604-05. 
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B. Injunctive Powers 
The new Commission is authorized to sue to en1om any con-
tract market or individual from violating the Act or from restrain-
ing trading in any futures contract.65 Such authority is essential to 
the effective regulation of volatile markets: If the Commission had 
been required to refer requests for action to the Attorney General, 
as most independent agencies must do, there would have been un-
necessary delay and the Attorney General would have had virtual 
veto power.66 Instead, the new Act requires the Commission only 
to inform the Attorney General of its actions. 
C. Regulation of All Commodities 
The Act provides the Commission with broad authority to regu-
late futures trading in all goods, articles, services, rights, and inter-
ests traded for future delivery.67 The extension of regulatory au-
thority to previously unregulated items should promote consistency 
in exchange operations and in brokers' handling of customer ac-
counts. It should also protect customers from fraudulent operations 
on futures markets, and it provides the authority to investigate trad-
ing activity on all markets.68 The new Act should thus allow investors 
to trade with confidence on all American futures markets. 
D. Emergency Powers 
The Act enables the Commission to take special action in 
emergency situations and to direct a contract market to take mea-
sures to maintain or restore orderly trading. The term "emergency" 
now includes, in addition to potential or actual market manipula-
tions, any act of the United States or a foreign government affecting 
a futures price and any other market disturbance that prevents the 
market from accurately reflecting supply and demand.69 The rapidity 
with which futures markets respond to external events makes it 
imperative that the Commission be able to take immediate action 
in such situations. 
IV. lsSUES LEFT TO THE COMMISSION To DECIDE 
A. Option Trading in Previously Unregulated 
Futures Contracts 
A commodity option is a right to buy or sell a specified quantity 
of a particular commodity, or a futures contract for a particular 
65. Pub. L. No. 93-463, § 211, 88 Stat. 1402. It should be noted that no restraining 
order, injunction, or writ of mandamus may be issued ex parte. 
66. See 1974 Senate Hearfags, supra note 37, at 202-03, 209, 368, 417-18. 
67. Pub. L. No. 93-463, § 201, 88 Stat. 1395. 
68. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 93-975, supra note 56, at 61-64; H.R. REP. No. 93-438, 
supra note 62, at 65. It has been suggested that in the past speculators who were 
prevented from manipulating regulated markets were likely to turn their attention 
to unregulated markets. 197:J House Hearings, supra note 50, at 10-11. 
69. Pub. L. No. 93-463, § 215, 88 Stat. 1404-05. 
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commodity, at a specified price within a specified period of time.70 
The purchaser pays a "premium" for the option, which varies in 
amount with the option's duration.71 In addition to the premium, 
the purchaser must pay one broker's fee at purchase, and another 
later if the option is exercised.72 Should the option purchaser fail 
to exercise his option, he loses the premium payment completely.73 
Options generally are available for periods ranging from two to 
fourteen months.74 
In the past three years, a new breed of commodity options, so• 
called "naked options," have been sold in this country.70 Naked 
options are based on changes in futures prices but are not backed 
either by futures contracts or by actual ownership of the com• 
modities involved.76 Limited capital requirements and lack of reg-
ulation make entry into naked option trading easy; the potential 
70. The right to buy a specified quantity of the commodity or commodity future 
at a price specified in the option contract on or before a specified date is called a 
"call option." The right to sell under such conditions is called a "put option." A 
"double option" is a combination "put" and "call" on the same commodity. It permits 
the holder to elect either to buy or to sell, but not both. 
The price at which the holder of an option can buy or sell the futures contract 
is generally called the "striking'' or basis price. It is normally the price at which 
the futures contract is trading when the option is purchased, See S. KROLL &: I. SHISKO, 
THE COMMODITY FUTURES MARKET GUIDE 259 (1973): 1974 Senate Hearings, supra 
note 37, at 825-27: Long, The Naked Commodity Option Contract as a Security, 15 
WM. &: MARY L. R.Ev. 212-13 (1973); Cal. Corp. Commn. Release No. 29-C, 1 BLUE 
SKY L. REP. ,r 8679 (Feb. 8, 1973): DuN's, March 1973, at 72, 
71. "Although the option premium is roughly equivalent to the margin require-
ment of a futures contract, it can run much higher, The cost goes up, for instance, 
on longer-term premiums. Critics • • • also charge that some undenvriters inflate 
the premiums so as to be able to offer their sales representatives handsome fees 
running as high as 20% to 25% of the premium." DuN's, March 1973, at 71. 
72, S. KROLL &: I, SmsKo, supra note 70, at 260, The broker's fee can be quite high, 
One options house official stated that some firms were charging broker's fees as high as 
12 to 15 per cent on the initial sale, and the same rate on reinvestments by the same 
customers. DUN'S, March 1973, at 72, 
73, As an illustration, assume that Green buys a one-year call option on a silver 
contract currently worth $18,000 ($1.80 an ounce for 10,000 ounces). He pays a pre-
mium of $1000 for the option. For Green to gain a profit, the price of silver must 
move up by more than 10 cents an ounce, Suppose that six months later, the price 
has reached $1.95 an ounce, Green exercises his option to buy the contract for his 
price of $18,000 and then sells it for its present worth of $19,500. His profit after 
deducting the $1000 cost of the premium will be $500, less the combined brokerage 
fees for buying the option and selling the contract. A put option simply works in 
reverse order. See Stipulation of All Relevant Facts in Lieu of Trial on Preliminary 
and Permanent Injunction, SEC v. Goldstein, Samuelson, Inc., Civ. A. No. 73-472 
(C.D, Cal. Oct. II, 1973). 
74. S. KROLL &: I. Sa1SK0, supra note 70, at 260, 
75, See generally Long, supra note 70: Bus, WEEK, March 10, 1973, at 43; FonnEs, 
Aug, 15, 1973, at 66; Wall St. J., June 28, 1973, at 38, col, 1 (eastern ed.). 
76. Long, supra note 70, at 220. 
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for abuse is correspondingly high.77 Moreover, naive investors are 
attracted to this area by its "get-rich-quick" potential.78 
The first comprehensive legislation regarding options was the 
Commodity Exchange Act of 1936, which banned option trading 
in all domestic commodities regulated by the Act.79 Trading in op-
tions on commodities not regulated by the Act80-mostly nonagri-
cultural international commodities-was not affected.81 Pressure to 
77. See, e.g., id. at 212-30; BARRON'S, Jan. 8, 1973, at 5, col. 2; DuN's, March 1973, 
at 69-72, 119-20; FORBES, Aug. 15, 1973, at 66. 
Options were identified in the late nineteenth century as one of the most easily 
abused aspects of futures trading; they were intermittently allowed and prohibited 
on exchanges for many years prior to 1936. As early as 1892 the Chicago Board of 
Trade attempted to improve its reputation as a legitimate commercial institution 
by prohibiting options. However, the directors did not vigorously attempt to dis-
courage their members from trading in options, and when some continued to do so, 
others followed. Hearings on Futures Trading Before the House Comm. on Agricul-
ture, 66th Cong., 3d Sess. 945, 949 (1921) [hereinafter 1921 Hearings]. Many exchange 
officials became convinced that the economic benefits of options were outweighed 
by the danger of their possible use to dominate futures markets. See, e.g., Hearings 
on H.R. 6772 Before the Senate Comm. on Agriculture and Forestry, 74th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 220 (1936) (letter from Board of Directors of the Chicago Board of Trade to 
J.P. Griffin, President, Chicago Board of Trade, April 12, 1921) [hereinafter Hearings 
on H.R. 6772]. Since buying options may sometimes be less expensive than buying 
the underlying futures contract, a speculator in options can dominate a market with 
less of an investment. This potential for abuse was deemed dangerous enough to 
outlaw options as early as 1921. See id. at 220-24. In addition, some felt that options 
trading was a prime cause of excessive price movements, See id. at 224. By the time 
of the adoption of the federal ban in 1936, trading in options was already prohib-
ited by the rules of many major futures exchanges. See id. at 225. 
78. There is an alarming number of cases of fraud based on naked option schemes. 
E.g., ln re Goldstein, Samuelson, Inc., 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 'if 71,095 (Okla. Sec. Commn., 
Feb. 23, 1973); Shapiro v. First Federated Commodity Trust Corp., 3 BLUE SKY L. 
REP, 'if 71,058 (Md. Cir. Ct., Baltimore Co., Feb, 27, 1973). See also N.Y. Times, 
Oct. 3, 1974, at 61, col. 1 (late city ed.). Such cases caused many states to stiffen 
their commodity option regulations. See, e.g., California Assembly Bill No. 799 
(Sept. 25, 1973). 
79. 7 U.S.C. § 6c(B) (1970). Several attempts to prohibit commodity options were 
made before 1936, but they were confined to one exchange or to a single state. E.g., 
Omo R.Ev. CODE ANN. § 2915.20 (Page 1953). See also 1921 Hearings, supra note 77, 
at 945, 949. 
80. These included silver, silver coins, platinum, cocoa, copper, coffee, and world 
sugar. 
81. Some options were written by domestic firms, but many of those trading in 
options chose to buy through the London commodity market. 
There are tW'O major recognized types of options: Mocatta options and London 
options. The members of exchanges handling Mocatta options are dealers in the cash 
or physical commodities themselves. Their options are covered by inventories of the 
physical commodity as well as by futures contracts for such commodities. Such options 
derive their name from the extensive dealings in them by the Mocatta Metals Cor-
poration. 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 827. 
London options are so called because they are traded in London and often guar-
anteed by the International Commodities Clearing House Ltd. in London, a part 
of the United Dominions Trust Group. The Clearing House handles both futures 
contracts and options for futures contracts. In order to exercise an option, it is 
necessary to make a request to the Clearing House that such an option be declared. 
The Clearing House then substitutes an appropriate futures contract for the option 
and sends a registration statement to both parties. The premium paid is turned over 
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outlaw fraudulent dealings in commodity options continued, how-
ever, and was a major factor leading to the 1974 Act.82 In response 
to the criticisms of option dealing, all of the comprehensive bills 
introduced in the Ninety-third Congress contained a flat prohibition 
on commodity options.83 Congress continued the existing ban on 
options in regulated commodities in the Act as passed. However, 
under strong pressure from those currently engaged in trading 
unregulated options,84 Congress delegated to the Commission the 
question of banning options in newly regulated commodities. 
The Commission must fully consider the pros and cons of option 
trading before making its decision. It would be a mistake to inter-
pret Congress' decision to delegate the issue to it as an indication 
of an intent to allow option trading in previously unregulated com-
modities. Neither the House nor the Senate Committee Report 
gives any clear guidance to the Commission in making this decision. 
In the absence of current legislative guidance, the Commission 
should give attention to the arguments that Congress considered 
persuasive in enacting the 1936 ban on options. In addition, recent 
experience and research raises questions about the arguments pres-
ently made by the options advocates. 
The fact that the 1936 ban on options in regulated commodities 
has not made domestic futures markets less effective places a heavy 
burden of justification on those advocating continuation of previ-
ously unregulated option trading. Proponents of option trading 
have attempted to demonstrate that the situation in international 
futures markets is distinguishable from that in the domestic market, 
and that options would serve a valuable function in the former, 
even though the judgment had been made to ban options in the 
latter.85 Thus, the international commodity exchanges in New York 
to the Clearing House and released only upon execution or abandonment of the 
option. Options currently are guaranteed in sugar, coffee, cocoa, wooltops, soybean 
oil, sunflower-seed oil, coconut oil, and cotton. See INTERNATIONAL COMIIIODITI.ES CLEAR• 
ING HOUSE LTD., LONDON CoMMODITY OPTIONS (1974) [hereinafter LONDON COMMODITY 
OPTIONS]; 1974 Senate Hearings, supra, at 827; Bus. WEEK, Dec. 21, 1974, at 145. 
82. See, e.g., 1973 House Hearings, supra note 50, at 11; H.R. REP. No. 93--975, 
supra note 56, at 37-39. 
83. H.R. 13113, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1973 (addition of § 201 without altering 7 
U.S.C. § 6c(B) (1970)); S. 2837, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 308(b)(2) (1973): S. 2485, 93d 
Cong., 1st Sess. § 6c(B) (1973); S. 2578, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1978) (addition of § 7 
without altering 7 U.S.C. § 6c(B) (1970)). 
84. The hearings include several detailed statements on the benefits of option 
trading. See, e.g., 1974 House Hearings, supra note 44, at 37, 132, 176, 190, 276; 1974 
Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 463, 502, 539, 730, 795, 809. Cf. 1921 House Hear-
ings, supra note 77, at 945, 949; Hearings on H.R. 6772, supra note 77, at 220-24, 
85. See, e.g., 1974 House Hearings, supra note 44, at 246, 276. Options proponents 
have noted that the London options market is backed up by a clearing house, and 
they have pointed to the utility of domestic metals options. See id. at 176, 190. How-
ever, they have neglected to add that only some of the London options are covered 
by the clearing house. Furthermore, this clearing house is a private, profit-making 
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have asserted that option trading adds a measure of liquidity to their 
markets that is not needed in domestic markets.86 This argument is 
weakened by the fact that the exchanges have thus far managed to 
conduct adequate markets in regulated commodities without options. 
Their need for additional liquidity :i;ests on the assertion that the 
new regulation of their markets authorized by the 1974 Act will 
drive much of their business abroad,87 an assertion that Congress 
rejected in deciding to regulate them.88 
Thus, there is little merit fu the attempt to separate options in 
domestic agricultural commodities from international commodity 
options. Moreover, all of the other arguments made in favor of 
option trading have drawbacks that are overlooked by their pro-
ponents. First, the options advocates frequently point to the eco-
nomic justifications for option trading. They argue that by investing 
in options, a company can hedge its inventory without tying up 
all of the capital necessary to make the margin payments on a futures 
contract,89 and note that an option purchaser can limit the maxi-
mum extent of his loss, thus facilitating planning.00 In fact, there is 
often little difference benveen the costs of options and futur~s con-
tracts. Although options do allow investors to limit potential loss, 
the premium and commission charges on options usually approxi-
mate the margin requirements of futures contracts.91 In order to 
make a profit, an investor must make more than the brokerage fee.92 
By trading in options the speculator thus sacrifices the opportunity 
to clear a profit on a relatively small market rise; his investment is 
usually of an "all or nothing" character. 
A second justification for option trading is that options may be 
used to finance speculative transactions with small amounts of 
institution, subject to little regulation. See LONDON COMMODITY OPTIONS, supra note 
81; INTERNATIONAL COMMODITIES CLEAllING HOUSE LTD,, A BACKGROUND NOTE (1973); 
1974 House Hearings, supra, at 176. -
86. 1973 House Hearings, supra note 50, at 120-21; 1974 House Hearings, supra 
note 44, at 267. 
87. 1973 House Hearings, supra note 50, at 120-21, 
88. It was also argued that Congress could reasonably choose not to reexamine 
the existing prohibition on options without having to extend that prohibition to 
options in the newly regulated commodities. "[T]he principal thrust of today's 
efforts," it was contended, was to increase regulatory safeguards, rather than to alter 
drastically an entire area of ongoing economic activity. 1974 House Hearings, supra 
note 44, at 193. However, the 1974 Act itself recognizes that in order to increase 
regulation, coverage must often be extended. 
89. See text at notes 263-64 infra. 
90. See 1974 House Hearings, supra note 44, at 190-92, 267-68. 
91. See note 71 supra. 
92. As a result, speculators or hedgers in options usually either lose their entire 
investment or at least double it. Interview with Houston A. Cox, Jr., Vice-President, 
Reynolds Securities, Inc., New York City, Oct. 10, 1973 (memorandum of interview 
on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
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capital.93 Options advocates suggest that this results in savings to 
producers, processors, and manufacturers and in lower consumer 
prices for finished goods. In fact, however, the size of the premium 
and commission charges04 paid on option contracts makes the savings 
less significant, and any advantage gained from such savings must be 
weighed against the danger that financially insecure traders or 
fraudulent promoters will be attracted. 
Supporters of option trading assert that the increased trading 
facilitated by options increases the stability of futures markets. They 
cite studies of speculation on futures markets suggesting that spec-
ulation reduces price fluctuations.95 Supposedly, speculatprs sell 
when prices are high, increasing supply and lowering prices, and 
buy when prices are low, increasing demand and raising prices.Do A 
1934 study did find that a stabilizing influence results from option 
trading,97 but that study proceeded solely on the theory that spec-
ulators in options tend to trade against price movements. In a 
pioneering article in 1937, H. S. Invin suggested that in fact much 
trading on exchanges is movement trading,98 in which investors buy 
when prices are advancing and sell short when prices are declining. 
Movement trading is still a factor on today's markets.DD Such be-
havior tends to exaggerate fluctuations, and options make movement 
trading even more attractive, because they limit the loss from guess-
ing wrong. Thus option trading may increase market volatility, as 
has long been suspected.100 
It is also argued that if American brokerage houses and interna-
tional firms are barred from trading in options, they will be at a 
competitive disadvantage with foreign firms that can so trade.101 
Brokerage houses fear that this will cause business to shift abroad. 
International commodity options, however, are used only by a small 
number of sophisticated dealers.102 Since it is questionable whether 
93. P. MEHL, TRADING IN PRIVILEGES ON THE CmCAGO BOARD OF TRADE 78 (Dept. 
of Agriculture Bull. No. 323, 1934). 
94. See notes 71, 72 supra. 
95. See 1974 House Hearings, supra note 44, at 200. 
96, ld, 
97. Id. at 192. 
98. lnvin, The Nature of Risk Assumption in the Trading on Organized Ex-
changes, 27 AM. ECON, REv. 267 (1937). 
99. Working, Tests of a Theory Concerning Floor Trading on Commodity Ex-
changes, in 7 STANFORD FOOD REsEARCH INSTlTlJTE STUDIES 24-28 (Supp. 1967). 
100. See, e.g., P. MEHL, supra note 93, at 76-78; Hearings on H.R, 6772, supra 
note 77, at 224. 
101. See, e.g., 1974 House Hearings, supra note 44, at 190, 246. 
102, It has been estimated that London options constitute something less than 
five per cent of the transactions handled by the International Commodities Clearing 
House Ltd., in London. Id. at 176. Because of the relatively high premium charged, 
few small investors are attracted. 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 827-28, 
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options cost less than futures contracts, an options prohibition may 
simply cause some clients to conclude that they can hedge just as 
effectively without options. 
The proponents of option trading further argue that regulation 
can control abuses in option markets, thus restoring public confi-
dence and making a complete prohibition unnecessary.103 For ex-
ample, they assert that anyone familiar with option trading will be 
able easily to identify financially irresponsible schemes by observing 
the low premiums charged.104 But adequate regulation may not be 
so simple. The limited capital requirements for entering into option 
trading allow firms to begin operation and prey on unsophisticated 
investors before regulation can be effective. A half-century of prob~ 
lems suggests that effective regulation of options is difficult, if not 
impossible. 
Finally, the proponents of option trading point to the London 
option market as evidence that a reliable and economically useful 
option market is possible. However, in that market actual holders 
of futures contracts write single options on each contract.105 Many 
American option undenvriters work on the different premise that 
option payments can be secured by holding futures contracts for a 
fixed percentage of the options issued.106 There are real questions 
as to what percentage reserve is necessary, and whether such a system 
can be safe at any percentage.107 
It may be that the Commission will need to undertake new 
studies of the economic benefits of international commodity options 
and their effect on market stability before reaching a decision to 
prohibit or to allow option trading in heretofore unregulated com-
modities. Any decision must balance the long record of concern over 
market volatility and customer fraud against the benefits cited by 
option trading proponents. It is submitted that without new and 
convincing evidence, the marginal economic benefit. of option trad-
ing does not outweigh the proved potential for harm. 
B. Time-Stamping and Identification of Traders in 
Daily Reports 
Of immediate concern to the Commission is the kind of informa-
tion needed to supervise the commodity markets adequately. The 
103. See 1974 House Hearings, supra note 44, at 267-68. 
104. See id. at 194. 
105. LONDON COMMODITY OPTIONS, supra note 81. 
106. See Long, supra note 70, at 220-21. 
107. In addition, an option dealer in America could not use the futures market 
simultaneously to underwrite the purchase and sale of an option. If a dealer under-
writes a purchase and a sale on the same futures contract, he cannot both buy and 
sell a futures contract on an exchange, because his transactions would nullify each other. 
One solution may be to require option writers to specialize in one type of future 
or one iype of option, but this may be economically impractical for dealers. 
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old Commodity Exchange Authority was criticized for making in-
sufficient use of the information available to it.108 The new Com-
mission, therefore, should establish clear requirements with respect 
to the daily trading information it will use and use that information 
fully.109 
One heated controversy concerns the need for recording the 
names of all traders in the clearing house records. The exchanges 
have argued forcefully that requiring this information would be 
a violation of confidentiality, that the information could not readily 
be obtained,11° and that sufficient information for regulation is 
already recorded. Nevertheless, there are persuasive reasons why this 
information is both essential to effective regulation and feasible to 
acquire. 
In most exchanges, observers are stationed in raised pulpits at 
each pit. These observers record the prevailing prices and times at 
which trades are made and feed this information into a communica-
tions system. The prices are then sent out over the wire services. 
Each participant in a trade notes on a card the price, quantity, 
delivery month, and other participant for each transaction. This is the 
second record of the trade, which is submitted to the clearing house 
for reconciliation with the record of the other participant at the end 
of the day. The clearing house will keep this record if it is accurate,m 
but it will know only the identity of the customer's floor representa-
tive for the trade and not the identity of the customer himself.112 
To determine the identity of the actual trader, the exchange mem-
ber who conducted the trade must be consulted.113 The exchanges 
have argued that, since the identity of traders is ultimately available, 
it is not necessary to require traders to identify themselves to the 
clearing houses.114 However, the current, indirect method of investi-
gating possible abuses is cumbersome and time-consuming, especially 
108. See, e.g., THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE U.S., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 
ON THE NEED To STRENGTHEN REGULATORY PRACTICES AND STUDY CERTAIN TRADING 
Acnvnms RELATING TO COMMODITY FUTURES MARKETS 8-14 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 
REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER]; OFFICE OF THE !NSPECfOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPT, OF 
AGRICULTURE, AUDIT R.El'oRT OF THE COMMODITY ExCHANGE AUTHORITY 8, 23-26 (1971) 
[hereinafter OIG REPORT]. 
109. The drafters of one proposed bill explicitly set forth the information exchanges 
should be asked to supply to federal authorities. Johnson Interview, supra note 12, 
This provision was adopted by the Senate, S • .REP. No. 93-1131, supra note 62, at 9, 44, 
but was modified in conference, so that the decision as to what information should be 
required was left to the Commission. Pub. L. No. 93-463, § 415, 88 Stat. 1415, 
110. See 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 309, 342-43, 403, 534-36, 
111. For more detail, see T. HIERONYMUS, supra note 11, at 30-32, 40-44, 
112. 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 204. 
113. See CoMMODlTY EXCHANGE AUTHORITY, U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, FINAL RE-
PORT OF THE JOINT USDA-INDUSTRY STUDY TEAM ON FUTURES TRADING DATA SYsr.EMS 
14-15 (1974) (hereinafter FUTURES DATA REPORT]. 
114. See 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 534-36. 
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when a large number of transactions is being investigated. Informa-
tion on the activities of a single trader or group of traders is not 
readily available. Moreover, Commodity Exchange Authority in-
vestigations, or trade-practice investigations,115 have generally in-
volved detailed examinations of all trades of futures contracts in a 
particular commodity on a particular exchange during a specified 
time period.116 These investigations have been inhibited by the 
need to consult several sources to obtain necessary information.117 
A related and important issue is whether to require exchange 
clearing houses to include the time of each trade in daily trading 
reports to the Commission. Only two small exchanges presently 
require brokers to time-stamp trades as they are made.118 On the 
larger exchanges, a trade is time-stamped when the order is received 
by the broker on the exchange floor and again when he returns it 
from the floor to the clearing member's representative.119 Much 
time may elapse between these events, and when trading is active it 
may become impossible to determine when a trade was made. 
Both the Comptroller General and the Administrator of the 
Commodity Exchange Authority have concluded that certain abusive 
practices are virtually impossible to detect without more accurate 
time-stamping.120 The final report of the Joint USDA-Industry Study 
Team on Futures Trading Data Systems concluded: "Lack of pre-
cise information on the time of execution has handicapped regula-
tion. The ability to reconstruct the exact sequence of trades has 
proven to be particularly valuable in investigating alleged trade 
practice violations. Such investigations have been thwarted on occa-
sions by the inability to reconstruct trading. The timing of trades 
is also important for certain types of manipulation investigations."121 
115. "According to the CEA, trade-pra~ce investigations represent the best means 
by which it can obtain information concerning the general trading practices on a 
futures market and detect violations in trading practices." 1965 REPORT OF THE 
COMPTROLLER, supra note 108, at 9. A fundamental purpose of the Commodity Ex-
change Act, unchanged by the 1974 Act, is to guard against speculation, manipulation 
and control, and sudden or unreasonable fluctuations in prices that are detrimental 
to producers, handlers, and consumers. 7 U.S.C. § 5 (1970). 
116. For more detail, see 1965 REPORT OF THE CoMPTRoLLER, supra note 108, at 8-9. 
The CEA has been criticized for conducting too few investigations, and for failing 
to follow up those that have been conducted. See materials cited note 108 supra. 
For a discussion of past studies of CEA trades-practice investigations and their short-
comings, see FUTURES DATA REPORT, supra note 113, at 1-3. 
117. See OIG REPORT, supra note 108, at 6. 
118. These are the Minneapolis Grain Exchange and the New York Mercantile 
Exchange. 120 CONG. REc. SlS,867 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1974): FUTURES DATA REPoRT, 
supra note 113, at 41. 
119. FUTURES DATA REPORT, supra note 113, at 40. 
120. 120 CONG. REc. SlS,868 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1974) (Letter from the Comptroller 
General to Senator Clark, Sept. 16, 1974 [hereinafter Letter of Comptroller General]; 
Letter from Alex Caldwell, Administrator, Commodity Exchange Authority, to Senator 
Talmadge, Sept. 11, 1974 [hereinafter Caldwell Letter]). 
121. FUTURES DATA REPoRT, supra note lllt, at 5. 
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Futures exchanges frequently experience rapid price movements. 
A dlfference of seconds in the execution of a contract can result in a 
substantial price difference.122 Detection of abusive practices will be 
greatly aided if federal regulators can obtain data about the order 
of trades and the identity of traders from a single source.123 Thus, 
accurate time-stamping would aid detection of floor brokers and 
futures commission merchants who trade for themselves before they 
fill customers' orders,124 or who favor certain customers over 
others.125 Such information also would help determine whether 
traders were improperly manipulating the closing price for a par-
ticular contract on a given day.126 The need for adequate informa-
tion is highlighted by recent official reports finding substantial evi-
dence of previously undetected violations of trading rules.127 
· Some exchanges have contended that time-stamping is imprac-
tical and would disrupt futures markets,128 but there are strong indi-
cations to the contrary. Time-stamping is already required on two 
exchanges,129 and the Administrator of the Commodity Exchange 
Authority has stated that its extension to all exchanges is feasible.180 
He admitted that time-stamping might delay execution or reporting 
of trades, but concluded that the problems would not be significant. 
The final report of the recent Joint USDA-Industry Study Team 
on Futures Trading Data Systems suggested several alternative pro-
122. See House Small Business Hearings, supra note 38, at 58-59. 
123. As the Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, Richard L. Feltner, explained to 
the Senate Agriculture Committee: "The major purpose of this legislation, of course, 
is to increase the ability to regulate • • • • The more information you have about 
the people who are trading, about the timing of trades, and exactly what took place, 
the more effective job you are going to be able to do of regulating this market," 
1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 243. 
124. See text at notes 140-200 infra. Time-stamping also would help to determine 
the extent of market participation by floor traders, and the influence of such par• 
ticipation on futures prices. See FUTURES DATA REPORT, supra note 113, at 40. 
125. For a more detailed discussion, see id. at 38-40. 
126. In its report on the Russian grain transaction, the Permanent Subcommittee 
on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations stated that the 
failure to record the times of trades made it impossible to determine whether orders 
to buy and sell on the Kansas City Board of Trade had affected closing prices. Such 
information was needed to determine whether large grain e..'<porters were attempting 
to push up closing prices in order to increase the export subsidies paid to them by the 
United States government on their sales of grain to Russia. Letter of Comptroller Gen-
eral, supra note 120, 
127. See, e.g., OIG REPORT, supra note 108, at 7. These findings, combined with 
numerous allegations in the press, compelled the Congress to require closer surveil• 
lance of the markets. See, e.g., 119 CONG, REc. S23,502-20 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1973); 
119 CoNG, REc. Sl7,732-34 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1973), quoting Washington Star-News, 
Sept. 25, 1973; Mollenhof, Risser & Anthan, supra note 41, at 813, 
.128. See, e.g., 120 CONG. REc. Sl8,867 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1974); 120 CoNG, REc. 
S18,872 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1974) (Letter from John Rainbolt, Associate Counsel, House 
Agriculture Comm,, to the Editor, Washington Star-News, Oct. 8, 1974). 
129. See note 118 supra and accompanying text. 
130. Caldwell Letter, supra note 120. 
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cedures by which information on execution times could be con-
veniently reported.131 
The exchanges have made the additional argument that pre-
serving the confidentiality of traders' identities and times of trades 
outweighs the benefits of having this information collected.182 They 
claim that traders may be disadvantaged if it becomes known that 
they are long or short in particular contracts.133 But information on 
traders' positions is often available even on current markets, and 
has not seriously hampered traders' operations. Moreover, informa-
tion collection systems can be designed to protect confidentiality. 
For instance, the Joint USDA-Industry Study Team on Futures 
Trading Data Systems has suggested a data system designed to allow 
the federal authorities to match each trade and each trader on the 
basis of the filings of traders and clearing members on each trade.134 
The trade information would not be matched with the identity of 
the traders before reaching the federal regulators.186 
The inclusion of the time of the trade and the identity of the 
trader in the information supplied to the clearing houses would be 
only a small addition to the data already supplied. Yet, one legis-
lator has callecJ. the provision allowing the Commission to require 
such information186 "potentially of more importance to the enforce-
ment of this act than any other provision therein."137 The present 
Commodity Exchange Authority Administrator has indicated that a 
change in information requirements will not be difficult to insti-
tute.138 The legislative history of the 1974 Act strongly suggests the 
intent of the Congress to include time and identity information 
131. See FUTURES DATA REPORT, supra note 113, pt. 4. 
132. See id. at xviii. 
133. See, e.g., 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 342-43. 
134. See generally FUTURES DATA R.EPoin-, supra note 113. 
135. There is a strong argument that it would be more efficient to compile this 
information at the clearing-house level. Since clearing houses receive all available 
information except the identity of the trader and the time of the trade, it would 
be more economical to add that data to their records than to burden the federal 
authorities with matching two data pools. One exchange has claimed that requiring 
this information to be included in its records might jeopardize its ability to dear 
each day's transactions overnight, 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 536, but 
this argument is not persuasive. As Senator Clark commented, "[y]ou [the exchange] 
keep hundreds of bits of information. It doesn't seem to me that [keeping traders' 
identities and time records] would add any great additional burden, if it were 
deenal important." Id. 
136. Pub. L. No. 93-463, § 415, 88 Stat. 1415, amending Commodity Exchange Act 
§ 4g(2), 7 u.s.c. § 6g(2) (1970). 
137. 120 CoNG, REc. HI0,262 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1974) (remarks of Representative 
Wampler). 
138. As the Administrator pointed out, the information will come from the 
clearing members and not from individual traders. Clearing members already report 
all information except the time of the trade and the name of the trader . to the 
clearing house and in some cases even the name of the customer is included. 1974 
Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 244; Caldwell Letter, supra note 120. 
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in trading reports as soon as practically possible.139 With this 
background, the Commission should find the case for requiring new 
information compelling. 
C. Elimination of Conflicts of Interest 
Few issues in the recent debate on futures trading reform have 
provoked as much disagreement as the question whether floor 
brokers and futures commission merchants should be permitted to 
engage in dual trading, that is, trading for their own accounts as 
well as for the accounts of their customers. The Congress delegated 
this issue to the new Commission, but required that it be resolved 
within six months.140 The Commission may continue to hold hear-
ings after its initial decision, and it may adjust its rules to meet the 
needs of changing conditions. However, as Senator Clark has pointed 
out, "[i]t is likely that the chief witnesses-and perhaps the only 
ones-before a Commission hearing on the subject would be the 
exchanges. Since the exchanges are made up of floor brokers, there is 
no doubt that the exchanges will argue that dual trading is essen-
tial • • • ."141 Yet, there is considerable evidence that the present 
practice of allowing dual trading is detrimental to the interests of 
producers, handlers, and consumers-the parties that federal futures 
regulation should protect.142 
In the quickly moving futures markets, the speed with which 
customer orders are filled can make an enormous difference in con-
tract price. Currently, a customer's order to buy or sell a futures 
contract is transmitted to a futures commission merchant143 (FCM) 
or to a floor broker,144 who fills the order. Under the old Commodity 
Exchange Act, the order must be filled on the floor of the exchange 
by "public outcry"; the FCM or floor broker cannot himself assume 
the other side of the contract.145 However, the floor broker may 
trade for himself or for the FCM for whom he works at the same 
time he fills customer orders.146 Thus, a floor broker may trade for 
himself one moment and trade to fill a customer's order the next. 
Also, because most FCM's employ several floor brokers, one broker 
may fill a customer order by trading with another broker who works 
139. See, e.g., 120 CONG. REc. S18,866-72 (daily ed. Oct. IO, 1974); 120 CONG, R.Ec. 
HI0,262-63 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1974). 
140. Pub. L. No. 93-463, § 203, 88 Stat. 1396. 
141. 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 204, 
142. See 7 U.S.C. § 5 (1970). Several government reports and a House Committee 
Report have recommended that dual trading by brokers be forbidden. See, e.g., H.R. 
REP. No. 93-963, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 52-54 (1974); OIG REPORT, supra note 108. 
143. See note 18 supra and accompanying text. 
144. See note 26 supra and accompanying text. 
145. See Commodity Exchange Act § 4b, 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1970). 
146. See generally H.R. REP. No. 93-963, supra note 142, at 52-54. 
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for the same FCM, and who is trading for his own account or for 
the house account of the FCM. 
Critics argue that this system is ripe for abuse because FCM's 
and brokers are given incentive to realize on favorable trading 
opportunities for their own accounts, rather than for the accounts 
of their customers.147 Furthermore, public confidence in the futures 
markets is eroded because a customer who makes a bad trade has 
good reasons to suspect his FCM or floor broker of a breach of duty. 
The exchanges respond, first, that there is no problem; second, that 
to the extent that there is a problem, it can be adequately handled 
by regulation; and, finally, that the elimination of such problems 
as do exist would create more harm than benefit. 
Although the exchanges have recognized the potential for abuse 
arising from dual trading by floor brokers, in particular, they have 
asserted that actual violations have been few.148 Frederick Uhlmann, 
Board Chairman of the Chicago Board of Trade, told the House 
Agriculture Committee that he could "state categorically that . • • 
there have been very, very few documented cases of such abuses."149 
Several recent studies directly contradict such claims. In a 1965 
report, the Comptroller General reviewed selected futures transac-
tions on one exchange and found forty-seven instances of question-
able trading practices during a three-month period.160 In nineteen 
of these cases, the records indicated that floor brokers had filled 
customers' orders noncompetitively by taking the opposite side of 
the transaction either for their o,vn account or for the account of 
their FCM.151 An audit report of the Commodity Exchange Au-
thority in 1971 also found evidence of widespread abusive trading 
practices.162 
The exchanges argue that the problem must be minor because 
it is difficult and unprofitable for floor brokers to engage in abusive 
147. See notes 152, 160-62 infra and accompanying text. William Phelan, Director 
of the Investigations Office, Chicago Mercantile Exchange, has acknowledged that 
"[t]here's an unbelievable temptation, if the trader sees that his own account shows 
a loss and the customer's account shows a profit, to substitute the trades." 119 CONG. 
REc. 523,504: (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1973). 
148. See, e.g., 1973 House Hearings, supra note 50, at 128-29; House Small Business 
Hearings, supra note 38, at 163, 192, 259; 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 521. 
149. 1974 House Hearings, supra note 44:~ at 163. 
150. 1965 REPORT OF THE CoMPTROLLER, supra note 108, at 11. 
151. Id. 
152. These included an excessive number of trades between brokers executing 
customer and house-account orders for the same firm, numerous trades between part• 
ners or members of the same firm, and trades in which the same broker represented 
both parties. Id. at 6-7, 59-67. During the period of dramatic rises in futures prices 
in 1973, several articles critical of futures trading regulation drew attention to alle-
gations of unethical practices. See, e.g., 119 CoNG. R.Ec. S23,502·20 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 
1973); 119 CONG, R.Ec. Sll,732-34: (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1973), quoting Washington Star• 
News, Sept. 25, 1973. 
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practices.153 An official of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange ex-
plained that a broker is legally responsible for executing all of his 
customers' orders pertaining to given futures contracts. Orders 
must be time-stamped when they come to the broker and again 
when they are retumed.1u4 Times can thus be checked against the 
exchange's record of market prices at different times.11:m If the broker 
fails to execute an order, or if he was negligent on the basis of what 
the exchange indicates the price of execution should have been, he 
can be held personally responsible for the customer's loss.1uo Such 
liability can be extensive. In addition, exchange officials assert that 
the severity and strict enforcement of rules prohibiting such conduct 
make it unlikely that floor brokers will breach their duties.11i7 
Nevertheless, witnesses who have traded on futures markets have 
stated that abusive practices are prevalent.158 First, they have pointed 
out that there is considerable doubt as to how rigorously the ex-
changes enforce their regulations.150 Second, the pace and informality 
of futures trading create numerous opportunities for abuse.100 Even 
a wink of an eye or a tug at an ear can indicate to a floor trader that 
he should buy from or sell to his friend, and then quickly get out 
of the market.161 It may be both profitable and simple for a floor 
broker to abuse his dual position by trading on his own account. 
Because of the volatility of the markets, and the volume at which 
153. See 1973 House Hearings, supra note 50, at 129, 
154. Id. at 194. 
155. However, there may be a long period of time between the broker's initial 
receipt of the order and his return of the executed order. 
156. 1973 House Hearings, supra note 50, at 194. 
157. Id. at 129 (statement of F. Uhlmann, Chairman of the Board, Chicago Board 
of Trade); 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 331 (statement of J. Geldermann, 
Chairman of the Board, Chicago Mercantile Exchange). 
158. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 93-963, supra note 142, at 52-54; House Small Busi• 
ness Hearings, supra note 38, at 50, 58 (testimony of H. Fortes, former Vice Chairman, 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange); id. at 258-59 (statement of Special Subcommittee 
Counsel Jacob Gross). 
159. An unidentified former official of the Chicago Board of Trade has been 
quoted as indicating that proposals to regulate closely the operation of scalpers 
have been under preparation for years. But, he asserted, "[t]hey always seem to get 
shot down at the end of the runway," because the Board of Directors is dominated 
by floor brokers, and a majority faction always votes the regulations down. 119 CoNC:. 
R.Ec. Sll,727-30 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1973), quoting Washington Star-News, Sept. 24, 
1973. 
160. A House Subcommittee found the possibilities for abuse "so great as to stagger 
the imagination." H.R. REP. No. 93-963, supra note 142, at 53. 
161. It is not even necessary that there be direct collusion. A knowledge of .the 
habits of fellow brokers and their customers, or of their usual actions when they 
have large orders to fill, can enable a broker to go in and out of the market on the 
price movement created by a large order. Because futures markets arc susceptible to 
sharp movements in reaction to sizeable individual orders, there is substantial temp• 
tation for a trader with knowledge of such an order to "ride the wave." 1973 House 
Hearings, supra note 50, at 9-10 (testimony of Representative Smith). 
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floor brokers can deal, they may make tens of thousands of dollars 
by engaging in dual trading.162 These potential gains make the risk 
of exchange discipline less menacing. 
If abuses do exist, the exchanges argue, they may be controlled 
by exchange and federal rules and regulations, without abolishing 
dual trading entirely.163 Exchange witnesses have argued that fed-
eral regulators already have the power to investigate floor brokers' 
activities and to issue complaints when they find violations of fed-
eral rules.164 However, in most cases it is difficult to obtain the 
evidence necessary to prove a violation.165 The problem is caused in 
part by the failure of some exchanges to time-stamp their orders or 
to record the names of customers who place orders.166 But even if 
the Commission required that this information be included in the 
daily trading reports, it would remain impossible in many cases 
directly to establish collusion between brokers. For example, abuse 
would be particularly hard to detect in a case in which a floor broker 
had several orders to fill within ten seconds during a major price 
movement. Even strict regulations can provide no practical deter-
rent in such situations. 
The exchanges make a compelling argument that dual trading 
should be preserved because it is necessary to exchange liquidity,167 
which they claim is essential to a successful market.168 A liquid 
market has a sufficient supply of bids and offers, which facilitates 
smooth price movements and swift execution of orders.169 Exchange 
officials note that a floor broker must at times assume the other side 
in a trade with one of his customers in order to provide the best 
execution of the customer's order.17° Furthermore, they assert, the 
162. See id. at IO. 
163. See, e.g., 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 331-33, 521-22. 
164. See, e.g., 1973 House Hearings, supra note 50, at 96 (statement of H. Chris-
topher, President, Board of Trade of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc.). 
165. H.R. REP. No. 93-438, supra note 62, at 53; House Small Business Hearings, 
supra note 38, at 337 (testimony of A. Caldwell, Administrator, Commodity Exchange 
Authority); id. at 306-07, (testimony of L. Greess, Acting Inspector General, U.S. Dept. 
of Agriculture). 
166. See text at notes 108-39 supra. 
167. See, e.g., 1973 House Hearings, supra note 50, at 71, 96, 129, 137, 164, 194; 
House Small Business Hearings, supra note 38, at 163, 214; 1974 Senate Hearings, 
supra note 37, at 313, 332, 386, 522, 672. 
168. See, e.g., 1973 House Hearings, supra note 50, at 96. 
169. See, e.g., id.; 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 332, 397. 
170. [F]loor brokers frequently are given a large order in a specified delivery 
month: which will require several transactions to complete. As the broker exe- · 
cutes this order he may see that its size is causing the price in that delivery 
month to move out of line with prices in other delivery months. In such a situ-
ation, the broker may find that he can effect the best execution for his customer 
by taking the opposite side of his customer's order (with the prior consent of 
the customer), while taking offsetting positions in different delivery months. 
1973 House Hearings, supra note 50, at 117. 
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market created by the trades of floor brokers allows commercial 
interests to fill their hedge orders without delay. This is especially 
important on the smaller markets, where commercial interests may 
account for ninety per cent of all transactions.171 Even on the larger 
markets, dual trading by floor brokers allegedly adds needed 
:flexibility.172 
The major fallacy in this liquidity argument is that floor brokers 
have no obligation to trade for themselves when markets are thin. 
They have no responsibility to the exchange,173 and in fact brokers 
are unlikely to trade in a market that is not also attractive to non-
broker traders. Many feel that floor brokers trade for themselves 
mostly in periods of substantial customer volume.174 A second 
weakness is that there is little agreement on the degree of liquidity 
necessary for a smoothly functioning futures market. One ex-
change official defined a liquid market simply as one in which a 
person coming to buy or sell can be confident of receiving a rea-
sonable price,175 because such a market will tend not to suffer from 
sudden :fluctuations in price.176 But this analysis overlooks the detri-
mental effect that personal trading by floor traders and brokers may 
have on the market. It is generally suspected that floor brokers 
trading for their own accounts concentrate more on intra-day 
trading, or scalping,177 than on position trading.178 A major SEC 
study of the securities markets found that "floor traders tend to have 
a destabilizing influence on prices ..•. [F]loor traders are generally 
buyers in rising markets and sellers in declining markets .... Their 
trading, as a result, is inimical to the orderly functioning of the mar• 
ket, tending to accentuate rather than stabilize price movements."170 
I'll. House Small Business Hearings, supra note 38, at 225. 
172. Supposedly, when volume is heavy, floor brokers fill customer orders; when 
volume declines, they tend to trade for their own accounts. 197!J House Hearings, 
supra note 50, at 129. 
173. The situation is different on the securities exchanges, where specialist brokers 
do have such a responsibility. See note 181 infra. 
1'74. See, e.g., 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 3'7, at 203, 376. 
175. Id. at 341 (statement of J. Geldcrmann, Chairman of the Board, Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange). 
176. For this reason, many feel that there can never be too much liquidity, See, 
e.g., id. at 284 (Letter of R. Richards, Vice-President, CPC International, Inc., repre• 
senting the National Grain 8: Feed Association). 
177. See text following note 27 supra, A scalper "attempt[s] to make a financial 
profit by entering and exiting from a market. in short periods of time after a very 
small profit has been made." B. GOULD, Dow-JONES-IRWIN GUIDE TO CollU.IODITIES 
TRADING 351 (1973). Sec also T. HIERONYMUS, supra note 11, at 45-46. 
178. Sec. e.g., 1965 R.El'oRT OF THE Col\Il'TROLLER, supra note 108, at 22. Position 
traders hold long or short positions over a period of days, weeks, or months. See Il, 
Gouw, supra note 177, at 350; S. KROLL 8: I. SmsKo, supra note 70, at 212. 
179. Sl>ECIAL STUDY OF SEcURITIES MArumTs OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COllt• 
MISSION, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 240 (1963) [hereinafter SEC 
SPECIAL STUDY]. 
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A similar analysis pertains to trading by floor brokers on futures mar-
kets. A floor broker has an advantage over an outsider in his ability 
to move in and out of markets quickly, and to make a profit on small 
price movements. If he sees a market trend, a broker is more likely 
to attempt to profit from it within one day than to tie up his capital 
in long-range transactions.180 Thus, the advantage of dual trading in 
terms of smoothing out price movements may well be outweighed by 
the tendency of dual trading to encourage artificial price levels.181 
The exchanges object to the proposed prohibition of dual trading 
because they fear it will precipitate an undesirable restructuring 
of the markets. Brokers forced to choose between serving customers 
and their mm accounts allegedly will choose the latter.182 This will 
force customers to take their business to new brokers with less experi-
ence and skill. But, if in fact most skilled brokers would choose to 
trade for themselves (which seems unlikely given the diverse busi-
ness interests of floor brokers), the resulting shortage surely would 
not be permanent. The supply of customers would attract new 
brokers who would develop the requisite skills. 
The exchanges claim that a prohibition on dual trading will have 
the additional undesirable consequence of discouraging speculation 
and will result in the domination of markets by commercial in-
terests.183 Recent increases in trading activity, however, suggest that 
180. See 1965 REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER, supra note 108, at 24 (CEA investiga-
tions of practices in the September 1971 rye futures market). 
181. While the available evidence suggests that liquid futures markets could func-
tion adequately without dual trading, some observers have suggested that a specialist 
system should be adopted by the futures markets, similar to the one that exists in the 
securities exchanges. See 1974 House Hearings, supra note 44, at 127 (testimony of 
A. Economou, President, American Board of Trade; President, American Association 
of Commodity Traders); id. at 189 (testimony of J. Bianco, Yale Legislative Services, 
Yale University Law School). Such a system seems unnecessary and unsuited to fu. 
tures markets. A specialist is an exchange · member who is granted permission by the 
exchange to trade in several specialty stocks. He executes certain orders for other 
brokers and is responsible for making a fair and orderly market in each specialty 
stock. See SEC SPECIAL SrunY, supra note 179, pt. 2, at 57-59. But securities exchanges, 
unlike futures exchanges, handle trades in a large number of stocks that can be 
divided easily among specialists. On a futures exchange, the volume of trading in one 
contract will often be too large for any one broker to handle, while in another 
contract there may not be enough activity to sustain a broker. See 1974 Senate Hear-
ings, supra note 37, at 342 (statement of J. Geldermann, Chairman of the Board, 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange). Furthermore, a specialist on a securities exchange is 
given a virtual monopoly, which can be extremely lucrative. Unless such a system is 
absolutely necessary to maintain liquidity on futures exchanges, its anticompetitive 
effects make its adoption undesirable. Cf. Pozen, Competition and Regulation in the 
Stock Markets, 73 MICH. L. REv. 317 (1975). 
182. See, e.g., 197J House Hearings, supra note 50, at 129; 1974 Senate Hearings, 
supra note 37, at 275. 
183. The reasons for this would be twofold. First, a forced separation of functions 
would result in less total speculative activity by brokers. Second, some of those specu-
lators whose brokers become only floor traders may not enter the market because of lack 
of confidence in other brokers. 1974 House Hearings, supra note 44, at 106-07 (testi• 
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substantial speculation in these markets will continue whether or 
not dual trading is banned.184 As long as many commodities remain 
scarce, and prices remain high, it is unlikely that speculators will 
lose their interest in the futures markets. Moreover, a decrease in 
speculation might not be unwelcome. Although some speculation 
is necessary to maintain liquidity, many analysts feel that excessive 
speculation may add to artificial price levels and thus distort the 
markets.185 Moreover, the markets are useful primarily because they 
serve commercial interests, and a more dominant position for these 
interests might be a beneficial side effect of prohibiting dual 
trading.186 
A more troubling objection is that a ban on dual trading might 
substantially weaken the smaller exchanges and deter the formation 
of new exchanges.187 While the dangers of dual trading on the large 
exchanges seem to outweigh the benefits, the equation may change 
if a ban would jeopardize the existence of smaller exchanges. One 
might answer that exchanges that cannot survive under a ban on 
dual trading are not economically viable, and should be allowed to 
collapse.188 However, the flexibility and competitive pressure brought 
about when larger numbers of markets trade in the same contracts 
are advantages that should not be dismissed lightly. Furthermore, 
on small markets it is easier to monitor broker practices for possible 
abuses. The Commission thus might make an exception for ex-
changes with a trade volume below a certain level. It could deter-
mine at what volume there is sufficient liquidity to absorb a ban on 
trades for brokers' o,;vn accounts without creating severe instability. 
This solution was proposed in Congress,189 and the emphasis in the 
1974 Act on maintaining liquidity seems to justify its adoption by 
the Commission. 
Finally, it could be argued that an absolute prohibition on dual 
mony of L. Melamed, Chairman, Chicago Mercantile Exchange); id. at 165 (testimony 
of F. Uhlmann, Chairman, Chicago Board of Trade). 
184. For statistics on the recent growth in futures trading, see 1974 Senate Hear-
ings, supra note 37, at 543-47 (attachments to statement of J. Clagett, President, 
Association of Commodity Exchange Firms, Inc., New York, N.Y.). 
185. See text accompanying notes 178-81 supra. 
186. Futures markets have developed into a means of providing commercial in-
terests with a way to transfer risk to those willing to assume it. Therefore, while 
speculators are needed, so long as there are sufficient numbers of them to facilitate 
hedging, domination of the market by commercial interests is not objectionable. 
187. See, e.g., 1974 House Hearings, supra note 44, at 17 (statement of Dr. C. Yeut-
ter, Assistant Secretary for Marketing and Consumer Services, U.S. Dept. of Agri-
culture); 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 386-87 (testimony of A. Donahoo, 
Executive Vice-President, Minneapolis Grain Exchange); id, at 738 (testimony of R. 
Schotland, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center). 
188. See, e.g., 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 686 (testimony of G. Clark, 
Professor of Law, Drake University Law School). 
189. See S. 2837, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 308 (1973). 
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trading by floor brokers might prevent them from correcting orders 
that either were not executed or were inaccurately executed.190 A 
floor broker must assume the risk of error in filling his customer's 
order;191 he must make the customer's order good, either by paying 
the difference bet\veen what the customer earned from the erro-
neous transaction and what the customer would have earned had 
his order been executed correctly, or by carrying out a proper 
reexecution. Even if brokers would continue to bear the financial 
burden of incorrect execution under a ban on dual trading, the ban 
would make it more difficult' for a customer to obtain his desired 
contract because the broker could not rectify the mistake· by trading 
for his own account with the customer, as is done under the current 
system. Moreover, the broker would bear a greater potential risk 
because he would be dependent on others to execute the correcting 
order, which will determine the extent of his liability for the origi-
nal mistake. If, on the other hand, the ban precipitates a shift in 
liability for the error to the clearing firm or the customer, the result 
could be less attention to the execution of orders and higher costs 
to the customer.192 Therefore, an exception probably should be 
made in a Commission ban on dual trading to allow brokers to enter 
the market under carefully circumscribed conditions to rectify their 
errors in executing customer orders. 
Although there are many differences bet\\Teen futures markets 
and securities markets, it is useful to note that the Securities and 
Exchange Commission has long been concerned with the abuses 
fostered by dual trading.193 A 1963 SEC study of the securities 
markets found that regulation of dual trading at that time was in-
adequate.194 The study contended that the privilege of access to the 
trading floor was a substantial advantage; the trader was able to 
observe trading activity at close range, thus developing a "feel" for 
the market, and could enter and exit in a matter of seconds. Similar 
advantages accrue to floor brokers on futures exchanges. Further-
more, securities futures brokers trading for their own accounts may 
avoid the standard commission costs, by executing either for them-
selves or through other floor brokers.195 These advantages of access 
to the trading floor place the retail customer at a competitive dis-
190. See, e.g., 1973 House Hearings, supra note 50, at 67 (letter from F. Corrigan, 
Peavey Co., Minneapolis, Minn., to W.R. Poage, Chairman, House Comm. on Agri-
culture); id. at 195 (statement of L. Melamed, Chairman, Chicago Mercantile Exchange). 
191. See text at note 156 supra. 
192. 1973 House Hearings, supra note 50, at 195 (statement of L. Melamed, Secre-
tary, Chicago Mercantile Exchange). 
193. See SEC SPECIAL SnmY, supra note 179, pt. 2, at 238-42. 
194. Id. 
195. See 1965 REroRT OF THE COMPTROLLER, supra note 108, at 23. 
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advantage, and can be eliminated only by prohibiting dual trading, 
as the securities study strongly recommended.196 
The objections to dual trading by floor brokers discussed above 
apply similarly to dual trading by futures commission merchants. 
An FCM may maintain a house account, and may trade for itself 
at the same time that it advises customers and solicits or fills cus• 
tomer orders. Many FCM's allow their account executives197 to 
maintain personal trading accounts, which the executives manage in 
addition to clients' accounts. Because a large order can have a sig-
nificant impact on trading in a particular futures contract, a poten• 
tial conflict of interest arises whenever an FCM holds a position 
in the same commodity. Furthermore, in periods of heavy trading 
a floor trader may be tempted to neglect his client's position in favor 
of trading for himself. A ban on FCM trading for personal accounts 
would prevent both these conflicts from arising.198 
Prohibiting dual trading would also prevent FCM's from making 
unfair use of inside information. Although exchange officials con-
tend that inside information is not a major problem on the futures 
markets,199 the ready access of FCM's to market information gives 
them a competitive edge over retail customers. Although FCM's have 
no better access to highly confidential information, such as govern• 
ment commodity reports, they do receive much useful information 
through informal interchanges on and near the exchange floors. 
Some observers argue that customers prefer to deal with an FCM 
who is a market trader. Personal trading supposedly gives the FCM 
a better feel for the market; if an FCM risks his (or its) own money, 
his recommendations will carry more weight.200 However, respon• 
sible FCM's should stay closely attuned to the markets whether or 
not they are personally involved in trading. Furthermore, FCM's 
who trade for their own accounts need not communicate their best 
strategies to their customers. 
If the weight of the arguments on this issue had been clear, 
Congress probably would not have delegated the decision to the 
196, SEC SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 179, pt. 2, at 241-42, 
197, An account executive is commonly known as a "broker," 
198, It is interesting to note that uvo of the largest commission houses arc so con-
cerned by this problem that they will not allow their salesmen or other employees to 
trade on futures markets; nor will they deal with brokers who trade for their own ac, 
counts as well as for their customers. Interview with Paul H. Franklin, Jr., Director 
of Commodity Division, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner 8: Smith, Inc., in New York, 
N.Y., Aug. 10, 1973 (memorandum of interview on file with the Michigan Law Review); 
Interview with Robert L. Radin, Vice-President, Paine, Webber, Jackson 8: Curtis, in 
Chicago, Ill., Aug. 17, 1973 (memorandum of interview on file with the Michigan Law 
Review). 
199. See, e.g., 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 313 (testimony of C. Bradley, 
President, The Board of Trade of Kansas City, Mo., Inc.). 
200. 1974 House Hearings, supra note 50, at 57 (testimony of M. Madulf, Madulf 
8: Sons, Chicago, Ill.); 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 713, 
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Commission. Uncertainty, however, should not indicate that a 
compromise is the best solution. Compromise is dangerous in the 
area of ethical market conduct; if futures markets are to be fair, 
and if public confidence in them is to be achieved, every taint of 
abusive practices must be eliminated. Dual trading should thus be 
prohibited, with the exceptions discussed above. 
D. Computerized Trading 
During the hearings on the 1974 Act, Congress received testi-
mony on proposals to computerize the entire futures trading sys-
tem.201 Under these proposals, all buy and sell orders would be 
matched electronically by an exchange computer. Although this 
system could largely eliminate the problems of inadequate daily 
trading information and floor trading abuses discussed above,202 
Congress apparently concluded that the idea did not . currently 
warrant legislative action. However, the new Act does require that 
the Commission conduct ongoing research into computerized 
trading.203 No time limit is set on this study, nor is there a provision 
for later reports to congressional committees. Unless the newly 
appointed Commissioners give priority to this issue, therefore, a 
decision on whether to encourage computerization could be post-
poned indefinitely. The discussion below will center upon the 
potential advantages of computerized trading, and indicate why 
objections to it are unpersuasive. 
Under the current system,204 the chaos of the marketplace some-
times prevents orders from being filled in the sequence in which 
they are received.205 Moreover, at a given moment prices may 
vary within a pit for the same contract on the same commodity,206 
because brokers in the pit sometimes cannot hear each other's bids 
above the din of the trading floor. An electronic system would 
alleviate these problems because it would permit trading in an 
orderly manner. Such a system would replace floor trading. Buy and 
sell orders would be fed into a computer, which would match the 
orders automatically.207 An accurate record of daily trading, includ-
201. See, e.g., 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 244-47, 253-54. 
202. See text at notes 108-200 supra. 
203. Pub. L. No. 93-463, § 416, 88 Stat. 1415 (1974). 
204. The essentials of the present trading system developed during the middle of 
the nineteenth century. See generally CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE, COMMODITY TRADING 
MANUAL 1-12 (1973); T. HIERONYMUS, supra note 11, at 69-91; H. IRWIN, EVOLUTION 
OF FUTURES TRADING (1st ed. 1954). Today the exchanges have a far larger volume 
and different trading problems, but their trading system has not changed substantially. 
See 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 352. 
205. See id. at 253. 
206. Id. 
207. House Small Business Hearings, supra note 38, at 340; Johnson Interview, 
supra note 12. 
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ing the names of actual traders, could easily be provided to federal 
regulators.208 If market manipulation were suspected, the pattern of 
trading could be quickly and accurately reconstructed. 
Computerization would end the potential abuses of dual trad-
ing.209 Collusion and careful mutual timing of trades would be more 
difficult in a computerized system. Moreover, such a system would 
protect customers from the inequities that would remain possible 
even if the Commission were to prohibit dual trading. Even under 
a ban, floor traders might enter into advantageous schemes with 
brokers.21° For example, a broker on the exchange floor might signal 
a floor trader of his intention to place a large order, in return for a 
percentage of the floor trader's profits attributable to the tip. On an 
electronic market, such schemes would be more difficult to execute, 
because of uncertainties in timing. 
Finally, a computerized system would lessen the influence of 
rumors on the futures markets.211 Rumors circulating on the ex-
change floor presently can have a decided effect on trading. If floor 
traders, on the basis of their "feel" for the market, believe that 
trading is moving in a certain direction, they ·will quickly buy in and 
out, thereby accentuating the trend.212 A computerized market 
could not accommodate trades at a frantic pace because of techno-
logical limits, and would thus force traders to wait a few moments 
between trades. This waiting period would make wild price move-
ments less likely.213 
The idea of a computerized market has met strong opposition 
from established traders and institutions.214 A common objection is 
that computerized trading is not technologically feasible. Even the 
exchanges are divided on this argument,216 however, and insufficient 
data are available to resolve the issue conclusively. Officials of the 
Chicago Board of Trade have cited a study of computerized trading 
made for the new Pacific Commodities Exchange that showed that 
it would be technologically feasible, but economically impractical, 
to develop such a system.216 Federal regulatory authorities also 
208. See FUTURES DATA REPORT, supra note 113, at 86. 
209. See text at notes 140-200 supra. 
210. See, e.g., 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 204 (statement of Senator 
Clark). 
211. Id. 
212. See text at notes 178-80 supra. 
213. See H.R. REP. No. 93-963, supra note 142, at 59-60. 
214. See, e.g., 1973 House Hearings, supra note 50, at 70, 95, 116, 190; House Small 
Business Hearings, supra note 38, at 162; 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 310, 
351-52. 
215. Compare 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 310, 351, with 1973 House 
Hearings, supra note 50, at 127. 
216. 1973 House Hearings, supra note 50, at 127 (testimony of F. Uhlmann, Chair• 
man of the Board, Chicago Board of Trade). 
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believe that a computerized system is possible,217 but they cannot 
predict t4e cost of a system without further studies.218 Complicating 
the lack of data is the forecast that the burden of adopting a com-
puterized system would be heaviest on the less affluent, smaller 
exchanges.219 
Some exchanges suggest that no action be taken until the secu-
rities markets adopt a computerized system.220 Those markets then 
will have assumed the financial burden of the technological develop-
ment, and the futures exchanges would need only absorb the cost 
of adapting the system to fit their own needs. But delaying the 
decision in this manner has disadvantages. Futures markets differ 
substantially from securities markets, and the adaptation process 
might be difficult and time-consuming. Furthermore, immediate 
and pressing problems pervade the futures markets,221 and delay in 
solving them might in the long run be more costly than immediate 
action. 
There are three ways to reduce the costs to the exchanges of 
developing a computerized system. First, the Commission could 
encourage the exchanges to pool their resources and develop a joint 
system. Second, the Commission could request federal appropria-
tions. Given the advantages of a computerized system for effective 
regulation, and the likelihood that the exchanges ·will not take the 
initiative in this area, the federal government should perhaps sponsor 
the necessary development. Finally, the securities and the futures 
exchanges could cooperate in developing the necessary technology. 
Many exchange officials are concerned that even if all of the 
technological and economic obstacles could be overcome, a com-
puter system would not ,adequately safeguard the information it 
would contain.222 Much trading data is already filed with clearing 
houses on the larger exchanges, however, and this system has not 
caused any major problems.223 If the detailed recommendations of 
217. See, e.g., 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 253 (testimony of A. Cald-
well, Administrator, Commodity Exchange Authority). 
218. See the recommendations for further study in FUTURES DATA Rm>oKr, supra 
note 113, at 85-86. 
219. See, e.g., 1973 House Hearings, supra note 50, at 70 (testimony of A. Donahoo, 
Secretary, Minneapolis Grain Exchange, Minneapolis, Minn.). 
220. See, e.g., id. at 116 (testimony of R. Clark, representing the New York Coffee 
&: Sugar Exchange, Inc., The Commodity Exchange, Inc., and the New York Cocoa 
Exchange, Inc.). 
221. See, e.g., text at notes 205-13 supra. 
222. See, e.g., 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 310 (testimony of W. Vernon, 
III, Executive Vice-President, Board of Trade of Kansas City, Mo., Inc.). One exchange 
official asserted that the possibilities of unauthorized access to data systems "stagger 
the imagination • • • ." Id. 
223. See T. HIERONYMUS, supra note 11, at 40-43; House Small Business Hearings, 
supra note 38, at 198-202 (testimony of R. Westley, Chairman of the Board of Gov-
ernors, Board of Trade Clearing Corp.). 
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the Joint USDA-Industry Study Team on Futures Trading Data 
Systems are adopted, the data reporting and storage arrangement 
would be highly mechanized. The Study Team concluded that such 
a system would adequately protect confidentiality.224 
It has been argued that trading from remote computer terminals 
would .make it difficult to investigate the financial status of one's 
trading partners.225 But even under present trading conditions, floor 
traders often do not know the identity or financial status of the other 
party. Moreover, the computerized system could screen participants, 
as is done now in deciding who will be allowed to trade on the 
exchange floors.226 
Another criticism relates to the ability of computers to allow 
for rapid correction of trading errors and withdrawal of bids and 
offers. 221 The necessity of placing orders through terminals limits 
somewhat the ability of traders to reverse trading directions quickly. 
The present federal administrator, however, has claimed that a com-
puterized system could be made practical in this respect.228 One 
possibility would be to allow orders to be withdrawn only if they 
have not been immediately matched. This might decrease market 
flexibility, but it would encourage traders to give closer attention to 
each trade. This solution might actually have a positive effect on 
market stability, by making rapid speculative trading more difficult. 
A final and more basic objection to computerization stresses the 
human element, which supposedly makes markets more responsive 
to users.229 Brokers use intuition and judgment in bargaining for 
their customers, intangibles that will be less important in an elec-
tronic marketplace. A mechanical system that matches orders with-
out offering an opportunity to examine offers or bids on the spot 
reduces flexibility, according to some. 
Individual brokers do try to get the "feel" of the market, and 
they adjust their actions accordingly. Indeed, a House subcommittee 
found that some futures traders pay little attention to the factors of 
supply and demand that theoretically shape market behavior. They 
are influenced instead by the attitudes of other speculators; if the 
belief develops in a pit that the market will go up, many traders 
224. See FUTURES DATA REroRT, supra note 113, at xii, 3, 17-18, 32, 52, 58. 
225. See 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 310 (testimony of W. Vernon, III, 
Executive Vice-President, Board of Trade of Kansas City, Mo., Inc.). 
226. E.g., RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE BOARD OF TRADE OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO, 
ch. 4, ch. 9, § 259 (1973). 
227. See 197J House Hearings, supra note 50, at 70 (testimony of A. Donahoo, 
Secretary, Minneapolis Grain Exchange, Minneapolis, Minn.). 
228. See 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 253 (testimony of A. Caldwell, 
Administrator, Commodity Exchange Authority). 
229. See 197J House Hearings, supra note 50, at 128 (testimony of F. Uhlmann, 
Chairman of the Board, Chicago Board of Trade); id. at 190 (testimony of M. Wein-
berg, Chairman of the Board, Chicago Mercantile Exchange). 
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will buy, thus stimulating an artificial upward movement.230 Many 
of these judgments are economically unsound, and of little benefit 
either to the market or to the economy. Some subjective assessments 
are valuable, but they could continue to play a role in a computer-
ized system. Brokers would have to judge the market from a dis-
tance, but this should put a premium on ability to evaluate supply 
and demand, government reports, and the many other elements that 
shape market trends, rather than discouraging reliance on such 
factors.281 
Of course, computerized markets would lack the color and excite-
ment of a pit full of frantic traders. But the futures markets play 
too important a role in our economy to ignore changes that may 
increase their effectiveness. Computerization might help to restore 
public confidence in markets that have been charged repeatedly 
with fostering abusive practices. In addition, the use of computers 
might aid in stabilizing prices and systematizing trades. These pos-
sibilities make at least the study of computerization immediately 
important.232 
V. PROBLEMS NoT CONSIDERED IN THE 1974 LEGISLATION 
Although the 1974 Act effects many major reforms, it fails to 
provide the new Commission with the authority to deal with two 
troublesome problems-the market distortions that may be caused 
when foreigners make sizeable trades on American exchanges, and 
the extent to which federal control should be exerted over margin 
requirements. Perhaps it was felt that these issues were beyond the 
scope of the Commission's regulatory powers.233 The discussion 
below will examine the importance of these problems and assess the 
role that the Commission could play in dealing with them. 
230. H.R. REP. No. 93-963, supra note 142, at 59. 
231. There would still be considerable advantages for brokers located near a 
board of trade, where they would have ready access to other traders and could 
keep close track of market movements. However, these advantages would be of less 
importance than they are in the current system, and the gap benveen those trading 
on the floor and those located elsewhere would be less conspicuous. See FUTURES DATA 
REPORT, supra note 113, at 86. 
232. See generally H:R. REP. No. 93-963, supra note 142, at 59-60 (conclusion of 
the Subcomm. on Special Small Business Problems, Permanent Select Comm. on Small 
Business, favoring computerized trading). See also FUTURES DATA REPORT, supra note 
113, at 85-86. Paul Franklin, Vice-President and Director of Commodites of Merrill 
Lynch, adds, "computerization is inevitable. If the Commission acts in an objective 
and knowledgeable way, commodities trading can only benefit." Bus. WEEK, Dec. 21, 
1974, at 145. See also UNCTAD SrooY, supra note 33, 11 42. 
233. Many feel that the issue of export controls involves the country's over-all 
agricultural policy, and not just the functioning of the futures markets. In contrast, 
it has been argued that margin controls can best be dealt with at the exchange level, 
rather than at the governmental level. See text at notes 263-315 infra. 
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A. Export Controls 
Few incidents involving the agricultural sector of the American 
economy have occasioned as much popular criticism and alarm as 
the so-called "Russian wheat deal" of 1973.234 The deal involved the 
sale of huge amounts of grain to the Soviet Union, and helped to 
drive wheat prices on futures markets to unprecedented levels,23G 
The concern over the wheat trade contributed to the increased 
congressional interest in futures markets that led to the 1974 Act.236 
Yet, the Act gives the Commission little authority to guard against 
the disruptive effects that such foreign trades can have on American 
futures markets. 
The omission reflects, in part, a determination that the futures 
markets were not solely responsible for whatever errors were made 
in allowing the wheat deal to occur. Once the sale had been made, 
much of the damage had already been done; the prices on the futures 
markets simply reflected the new supply and demand situation on 
the cash market. But the futures markets remain crucial to successful 
negotiations between American companies and large foreign buyers 
of American commodities.237 Moreover, the intent of Congress in 
adopting the 1974 Act was to ensure "fair practice and honest dealing 
on the commodity exchanges," and to provide "a measure of control 
over those forms of speculative activity which often demoralize the 
markets to the injury of producers, consumers, and the exchanges 
themselves."238 As will be demonstrated, without control over the 
access of large foreign traders to American markets, or control of 
American exporters that attempt to hedge large orders, the Com-
mission often will be unable to pursue its mandate. 
Large export transactions with foreign governments or com-
panies pose two problems. The first is the potential for foreign 
manipulation of American markets. Presently, foreign companies 
and governments are as free as domestic traders to take speculative 
positions on American futures markets. They are subject only to 
the limits on speculation that are imposed by federal authorities on 
American trading firms.239 However, unlike domestic traders, for-
eign traders may speculate indirectly, and thereby avoid these re-
234- For a general description of the chronology of this incident, and its impact, 
see J. TRAGER, AMBER WAVES OF GRAIN {1st ed. 1973). 
235. See Bus. WEEK, Aug, 4, 1973, at 46; New York Times, Oct. 15, 1973, at 58, 
col. 1 (late city ed.), 
236. See 1974 House Hearings, supra note 44, at 21 (testimony of Dr. C. Ycuttcr, 
Assistant Secretary for Marketing and Consumer Services, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture), 
237. See H.R. REP. No. 93-963, supra note 142, at 31-36. 
238. S. REP. No. 93-1131, supra note 62, at 1. 
239. For example, the maximum net long or net short position that any person 
may hold in any one grain on any contract market is 2 million bushels, 7 U.S,C. 
§ 6a (1970); 17 C.F.R. § 150 (1974). 
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quirements, because federal authorities have inadequate information 
to determine in advance whether the foreign customer really intends 
to export all of the cash commodity he purchases, or whether he 
intends to use it for speculation. Thus, a foreign country can buy 
more of the cash commodity than it actually needs for its own con-
sumption and hold the excess in American storage facilities until 
the price has risen. It can then sell the excess on the cash market, 
often at a price high enough to pay for the entire initial purchase.240 
The cash price may drop, of course, but the foreign buyer can 
hedge by taking a long position on the futures markets. When the 
futures sellers discharge their obligation, little o~ the commodity 
will be available on the cash market, so prices will have . risen 
substantially. · 
Another, more complicated scheme allows large foreign traders 
to profit from market distortions by taking a short rather than a long 
position on the futures markets.241 A foreign company or country 
could first purchase extra inventory of a commodity. After waiting 
for the increase in futures prices that would reflect the shortage on 
the cash market, it could hedge its inventory by selling short-that 
is, by buying contracts to sell-at the prevailing high price. It 
could then release its excess commodity for general sale, which 
would drive futures prices down. Subsequent liquidation of its 
short position would yield a substantial profit. 
The consequences of such manipulation could be far more 
serious than even the consequences of the Russian wheat deal.242 
Congressman Neal Smith noted that 
what happened is not the worst that can happen. There are other 
• dangers lurking around the comer, and we ought to be thinking 
about these things before they are upon us. One of them that appar-
ently we really have not been giving enough attention to is the 
possibility that some company, or some foreign country indirectly 
through a company could really distort our grain market more than 
all the other speculators we are worried about could possibly do.243 
The Commission might request several powers that would 
enable it to deal with these problems. An extreme proposal by an 
official of one large export company would ban foreign governments 
from hedging on American futures markets.244 The official argued 
240. The House Small Business Subcommittee investigating futures markets esti-
mated that a foreign party could take delivery of only one quarter of a big purchase 
and make enough profit from the resale of the rest to pay for the grain that is 
actually exported and consumed. H.R. REP. No. 93--963, supra note 142, at 35. 
241. See House Small Business Hearings, supra note 38, at 378. 
242. See id. at 377. 
243. Id. 
244. 1973 House Hearings, supra note 50, at 178 (statement of W. Saunders, Group 
Vice-President, Cargill, Inc., Washington, D.C.). 
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that, since foreign governments supposedly acquire commodities 
only for direct consumption, they should not need to hedge their 
inventories. Foreign governments would then be subject to the 
speculative trading limits on all of their transactions, and there 
would be no possibility of massive price manipulation. While such 
a solution would be easy to enforce, it would place foreign interests 
at a significant disadvantage on American markets. The American 
futures markets play a central role in the determination of world 
prices in many commodities, and it is desirable to keep them as open 
as possible. Before imposing such a stringent restriction on foreign 
interests, the Congress and the Commission should explore less 
onerous controls: 
The Commission must be able to ensure that foreign parties 
that trade on American futures markets will abide by the same 
limitations that are imposed on domestic traders. One mild measure 
would be to require that an FCM trading for a foreign party secure 
from it a signed document stating that it is aware of the limits on 
speculation and agrees to abide by them.246 Such a document, how-
ever, would have little effect on those intent on avoiding the 
restraints. 
A more effective approach was suggested in an amendment to the 
1974 Act proposed by Senator Clark of Iowa. Clark's amendment, 
rejected by the Senate Agriculture Committee, would have required 
that an FCM trading for a foreign party obtain from the party a 
surety bond in an amount set by the Commission before any order 
to purchase or sell a futures contract could be accepted.246 The bond 
would be forfeited to the United States if the foreign party failed to 
submit to the jurisdiction of the American courts, the Commission, 
or an exchange in an action to enforce the 197 4 Act. The Commis-
sion would be free to waive the bond when a foreign trader's over-all 
position fell below a fairly substantial dollar amount. If the bond 
were sufficiently high, its requirement would assure the cooperation 
of foreign parties with domestic trading regulations without seri-
ously restricting their access to American markets. 
The Clark proposal would in no way compromise the confi-
dentiality that foreign traders desire. The bond would not even 
have to be posted until after the completion of the cash transaction, 
when the seller might need to hedge. Moreover, the FCM could exe-
cute the bond confidentially, so that others would not become aware 
of the trader's speculative or hedging position. Foreign traders 
would undoubtedly consider the bond requirement annoying, but if 
245. Interview with Robert L. Radin, Vice-President, Paine, Webber, Jackson &: 
Curtis, in Chicago, m., Nov. 7, 1974 (memorandum of conversation on file with the 
Michigan Law Review) [hereinafter Radin Interview]. 
246. The proposed amendment was identical to S. 2837, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 303(b) 
(1974). 
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they were taking a legitimate futures position, it would be only a 
formality for them. The importance of securing adherence to 
trading regulations, without endangering the ready accessibility of 
American markets to foreign traders, should prompt the Commis-
sion to urge Congress to reconsider the Clark proposal. 
Foreign manipulation of American markets is only one of the 
dangers of noncontrolled large export trading. The second danger is 
disguised speculation by foreign interests, which is made possible 
by the hedging of American grain companies and exporters. When 
a foreign country (perhaps represented by a large foreign company) 
wants American wheat,247 it will usually contract to buy it at a fixed 
price with one or more American grain export companies. The 
export firms are willing to sell at a fixed price for future delivery 
because they can hedge their sales on the futures markets248 by 
buying futures contracts that mature at the same time the grain is 
to be exported. There is no limit on the amount of futures that a 
company may buy, as long as the purchases are for legitimate hedging. 
The Russian wheat deal is illustrative. Once the original sales 
contracts were made, participating American companies quickly 
moved into the futures markets to cover their price position, and 
into the cash market to contract for the actual grain.249 They were 
able to do so at prices that had not yet been affected by the news of 
the Russian deal. As the extent of the sales became known, the value 
of the wheat not already under contract increased, and both cash 
and futures price levels rose dramatically. Those who were unaware 
of the deal suffered the losses, while the participating grain com-
panies profited.250 
The attractiveness to foreign interests of agreements with Amer-
ican export firms is based in large part on the firms' willingness to 
agree to fixed prices for future delivery. This willingness is possible 
only because the firms can hedge their prices on the futures markets. 
Even though the foreign party does not itself enter the futures mar-
ket, and even though the price distortion is caused by hedging rather 
than by speculation, the need for regulation in this area is clear. 
Current efforts at control have been based on agricultural policy 
considerations that transcend impact on the futures markets. While 
the problem does go beyond the markets, it is imperative that the 
Commission have an input into policy determinations in the export 
area. 
The most dramatic means of regulating foreign speculation 
247. To simplify discussion, this section will refer only to wheat. Similar export 
sales, of course, could be made in most commodities in which futures contracts are 
traded. 
248. See H.R. REP. No. 93-963, supra note 142, at 31. 
249. 197:J House Hearings, supra note 50, at 13 (testimony of Representative Smith). 
250. H.R. REP. No. 93-963, supra note 142, at 35. 
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would be to impose either rigid export controls, with quotas for 
each nation that wants to buy American products, or floating export 
controls, which vary each year with the size of the crops.21i1 The 
foreign and domestic policy ramifications of such proposals are 
beyond the scope of this note. The implication for the futures 
markets would be to limit foreign interests to the amount of each 
commodity needed for consumption. The controls would deter 
foreign groups from leaving a portion of the commodities they 
purchase in this country for later speculation. Furthermore, since 
the maximum amount of each nation's purchase would be public 
knowledge, each exporter would have a better idea of how much 
foreign interests were buying from other companies. American 
hedgers would thus be better apprised of the supply and demand 
factors likely to influence futures prices.252 
There has been considerable opposition to the establishment of 
controls, from both private interests and public officials. Negotia-
tions ben'leen foreign buyers and large American grain companies 
are extremely delicate. The grain companies fear that a requirement 
to report major agreements with foreign parties would dissuade 
those parties from purchasing grain in this country.203 Agricultural 
exports are an important source of balance of payments income,2u4 
and few wish to jeopardize them. However, the consequences of 
market disruption or distortion, such as the· 1973 rise in price levels 
caused in part by the Russian grain deal, are also grave. When mar-
kets are distorted by enormous foreign sales, many may demand that 
the government impose controls by fiat, or close the futures markets 
entirely.255 Such actions would wreak havoc with the free market 
system and reduce foreign confidence in the ability of American 
firms to honor their sales agreements.256 
251. Floating export controls have been proposed by Robert L. Radin. Radin 
Interview, supra note 245. 
252. The Subcommittee on Special Small Business Problems of the House Select 
Committee on Small Business concluded that the lack of knowledge by each export 
firm of the extent of other Russian grain purchases, and the length of time before 
the users of futures markets became aware of the dimensions of the deal, enabled the 
Russians to buy at low price levels and thus to transfer much of the cost of the deal 
to other traders. H.R. REP. No. 93-963, supra note 142, at 31-36. 
253. See, e.g., 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 605-06 (testimony of C. 
Roberts, Jr., Vice-President, and R. Johnson, Manager, Public Affairs Department, 
Cargill, Inc., Minneapolis, Minn.). 
254. See House Small Business Hearings, supra note 38, at 127 (testimony of J. 
Spicola, Group Vice-President, Cargill, Inc., Minneapolis, Minn.). It has been esti-
mated that foreign sales of American commodities alone total $21.3 billion. FoRill!S, 
Dec. 15, 1974, at 66. 
255. See 1973 House Hearings, supra note 50, at 13 (statement of Representative 
Smith). 
256. In arguing against export controls, the President of the Chicago Board of 
Trade points out that "[e]xport controls send false signals to producers and con-
sumers. They are a disincentive to more production and an incentive for more con-
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Reporting requirements offer a less drastic measure with which 
to combat disguised speculation by foreign interests. The present 
administration has shortened the period for voluntary reporting of 
export sales three times since the Russian wheat deal.257 Despite the 
objection of export firms that a reporting requirement soon after 
sales would drive away their business,258 the administration has now 
requested firms to report advance sales over a minimum size to the 
Secretary of Agriculture.259 While insisting that the reports are 
voluntary, the Secretary has indicated that lack of cooperation by 
firms would result in mandatory controls.260 A major weakness of 
this informal system is that it does not provide for prompt sharing 
of trading information with the Commission. It is essential that the 
Commission have access to such information, and that it have a 
voice in deciding which foreign sales will be approved. Also, the 
quality of information could be improved if Congress were to adopt 
a measure similar to that proposed by Senator Clark to the Senate 
Agriculture Committee in 1974. The Clark amendment would have 
required export firms to report to the Commission the "initiation, 
completion, or termination" of any negotiations with foreign 
parties.261 Such a strict requirement, rejected by the Committee, 
would have given federal authorities more time to study the effect 
sumption." Because of recent ad hoc controls, he asserts, "[w]e are in danger of 
losing valuable markets and foreign currency." FORBES, Dec. 15, 1974, at 66. 
257. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1974, at 1, col. 8 (late city ed.). 
258. See, e.g., 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 605-06 (testimony of C. 
Roberts, Public Affairs Dept., Cargill, Inc., Minneapolis, Minn.). 
259. The current "volunteer'' plan asks grain companies to report in advance pro-
posed sales of 50,000 or more tons of grain or soybeans, as well as cumulative sales 
to one country that exceed 110,000 tons per week. N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1974, at 1, 
col. 8 (late city ed.); id., Oct. 9, 1974, at 55, col. 8 (late city ed.). 
260. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1974, at I, col. 8 (late city ed.). 
261. The text of the amendment, similar in intent to S. 2837, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 
§ 209 (1974), is as follows: 
Section 216: The Commodity Exchange Act, as amended, is amended by insert-
ing the following new section immediately after Section 4g (7 U.S.C. 6g): 
Section 4h. {a) Any person who negotiates to buy or sell goods, articles, 
services, rights or interests which may have an extraordinary impact on the fu-
tures market from sellers or to buyers outside the United States, respectively, 
which are the subject matter of a futures contract traded in the United States, 
shall file an exporter-importer report with the Commission upon the initiation, 
completion, or termination of any negotiations with a person outside the United 
States relating to the purchase or sale of such goods, articles, services, rights or 
interests. The reports shall contain such information and be filed in the form and 
manner the Commission prescribes. The Commission may require any subsequent 
reports under this section necessary to update the information in the exporter-
importer report. 
(b) The Commission shall, by rule, designate the amount of an import or 
export which may have an ~traordinary impact on futures markets. 
(c) The Commission shall obtain the information specified in subsection (a) 
from other federal agencies to the extent it is available from them. 
(d) Names of individual companies shall be confidential and no other infor-
mation regarding the import or export may be made public until negotiations 
are completed. 
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on the market of large foreign trades, and greater flexibility in 
deciding what measures to take to protect the futures markets. If 
Commission officials did receive the information called for in the 
Clark amendment, they could make a prompt announcement of 
large sales to foreign interests. The time at which knowledge of 
such sales is made public is crucial in terms of market impact. While 
disclosure of negotiations prior to the completion of the contract 
would make trading difficult, and should be prohibited, prompt 
announcement of the sale would severely curtail the amount of 
hedging that would be possible at low prices. Export firms probably 
would respond by limiting the amount of physical commodities they 
would be willing to sell for future delivery at fixed prices. 
The failure to give the Commission authority to deal with the 
impact of foreign sales on futures markets is a major flaw in the 
197 4 Act. At the very least, the Commission should have access to 
the voluntary reports presently received by the Secretary of Agri-
culture. More importantly, the present system should be made 
mandatory, and an amendment requiring reporting to the Com-
mission should be enacted. In addition, the Commission's ability to 
ensure stable markets would be increased if it were allowed to 
make the reports public when it determines that disclosure would 
be in the public interest.262 
B. Oversight of Margins 
A "margin" is the amount that a trader buying a particular 
contract is required to deposit with his futures commission mer-
chant for ultimate deposit with the clearing house.283 It is similar to 
an earnest money payment, which serves as an indication of the good 
faith of the purchaser. Low margins are attractive to traders because 
they can establish a larger market position ·with less capital. The 
minimum amount of margin that is acceptable on each contract is 
set as often as once a day by the exchange on which the contract is 
bought, on the basis of the previous day's prices.284 
Questions at the center of the debate over regulation of futures 
markets have been whether the federal government should oversee 
the setting of margins, and whether it should have the power to 
change margins in certain emergency situations.20u The 1974 Act 
262. See S. 2837, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 209(d) (1974). 
263. See T. HIERONYMUS, supra note II, at 62-65, 
264. Id. 
265. See, e.g., Hearings To Amend the Commodity Exchange Act Before the HollSe 
Comm. on Agriculture, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) [hereinafter 1967 HollSe Hearings]; 
Hearings on the Anti-Inflation Program as Recommended in the President's Message 
of November 17, 1947 Before the Joint Comm. on the Economic Report, '19th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1948). 
March 1975] Notes 751 
apparently denies the Commission any such authority,266 and thus 
leaves the individual exchanges, in exclusive control of the setting of 
margins.267 There are persuasive reasons why this approach is un-
wise and unworkable. This section will argue that Congress, swayed 
by determined and vocal opposition to federal oversight of mar-
gins,268 overlooked several ways to delegate limited supervisory au-
thority to the Commission without lessening the day-to-day freedom 
of the exchanges to determine margin levels. 
As noted above, a margin payment is a deposit, given by a trader 
to his futures commission merchant as "earnest money." The ex-
changes establish a minimum acceptable margin, although the indi-
vidual FCM may decide to require more in particular cases.269 The 
deposit guarantees that the trader will fulfill his obligations under 
the futures contract. Margins are especially important in the futures 
market because most investors have no intention of buying the 
actual commodity; they contract only to buy or to sell a specified 
amount of the commodity at a certain time in the future.270 Since 
the purpose of the margin is to assure the broker that he will be 
able to liquidate the contract if the market moves adversely to it, 
the broker may require an additional margin deposit if the market 
price of the trader's contract falls.271 An additional deposit may also 
be called for if the exchange alters the amount of margin required 
on a particular contract.272 If a customer fails to meet a margin call, 
the FCM will immediately liquidate his position; the customer ·will 
be liable for any losses caused by a decline in the value of the con-
266. See Pub. L. No. 93-463, § 213, 88 Stat. 1404. 
267. The act does grant the Commission emergency power to "direct the 
market" whenever "an emergency exists," however, and the term "emergency" in-
cludes any "major market disturbance which prevents the market from accurately 
reflecting the forces of supply and demand •••• " Pub. L. No. 93-463, § 215, 88 Stat. 
1405. This provision arguably gives the Commission authority to determine margins 
in rare situations. 
268. See, e.g., 1973 House 'Hearings, supra note 50, at 93 (statement of H. Chris-
topher, President, The Board of Trade of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc.), id. at 109-11 
(statement of R. Clark, representing the New York Coffee &: Sugar Exchange, Inc.), id. 
at 146 (statement of W. Brooks, President, National Grain Trade Council, Washing-
ton, D.C.); 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 287 (statement of C. Bradley, 
President, Board of Trade of Kansas City, Mo., Inc.); id. at 336-37 (statement of L. 
Melamed, Chairman, International Monetary Market, Chicago Mercantile Exchange); 
id. at 392 (statement of Dr. R. Dahl, Professor, University of Minnesota); id. at 447-48 
(statement of F. Rhodes, President, New York Cotton Exchange); id. at 493-94 (appen-
dix to statement of C. Chapin, representing the New York Coffee &: Sugar Exchange, 
Inc., the New York Cocoa Exchange, and The Commodity Exchange, Inc.); id. at 
516-17 (statement of P. Franklin, Vice-President, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith). 
269. T. HIERONYMUS, supra note 11, at 62-65. 
270. See 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 493. 
271. See H.R. REP. No. 93-963, supra note 142, at 17-18. 
272. Id. 
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tract prior to liquidation.278 Brokerage firms that are members of an 
exchange's clearing house must keep the set minimum amount of 
margin money on deposit at the clearing house.274 As described 
earlier,275 the clearing house determines a settlement price for con-
tracts each day, and members either receive or pay money to the 
clearing house depending on whether they have a surplus or defi-
ciency in their margin accounts. Normally, the initial margin ad-
justments will be a day's only margin transaction, but a member 
may be asked to deposit additional margin on an hour's notice when 
market prices move very rapidly.276 
There has been great confusion over the effects of changes in 
margin requirements during periods of large market fluctuation. 
Two government statements that argued that the federal govern-
ment should be given increased authority over margins gave dia• 
metrically opposed reasons for their conclusions.277 In 1966 the 
Department of Agriculture favored government authority to estab-
lish minimum margin requirements when "there is reason to believe 
there is danger of price manipulation, or unreasonable sudden 
price fluctuations or unwarranted changes in price, excessive spec-
ulation, or any other activity reasonably expected to restrain 
trade."278 An Assistant Secretary explained that, during some major 
fluctuations, the raising of margins would help to prevent excessive 
speculation.279 In contrast, the 1974 report of the House Small Busi-
ness Subcommittee argued that federal oversight of margins was 
needed to prevent the exchanges from raising margins unnecessarily 
in times of market fluctuation.280 They were concerned that ex-
changes might raise margins to benefit certain trading interests at 
the expense of others. The report cited the complaints of legiti-
mate hedgers who, during the 1973 rise in futures prices for soybeans 
273. Id. 
274. For more detail on clearing house operations, see CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE, 
supra note 204, at 29-34; T. HmRoNYMus, supra note 11, at 40-43. 
275. See text at notes 22-24 supra. "' 
276. See T. HIERONYMUS, supra note 11, at 42. 
277. Compare 1967 House Hearings, supra note 265, at 10-32, with H.R. REP. No. 
93-963, supra note 142, at 17-21. 
278. 1967 House Hearings, supra note 265, at 12. 
279. Id. He argued that raising margins could prevent excessive speculation by 
retarding the buildup of large holdings of a particular futures contract by a small 
number of people, or by reducing the amount of such holdings already in existence. 
He pointed out that there were several instances in which e.xchange officials refused 
to heed the requests of the Department that margins be raised substantially in order 
to lessen excessive speculation. Id. at 29-30. The most noteworthy example occurred 
in 1947, when the exchanges refused to comply with a request by the Commodity 
Exchange Authority for higher margins that was intended to dampen soaring food 
prices. President Truman directly criticized the exchanges on the radio and proposed 
an amendment to the Commodity Exchange Act that would have authorized him to 
order compliance. 
280. H.R. REP. No. 93-963, supra note 142, at 17-21. 
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and com, had to incur substantial increases in costs simply to meet 
margin calls.281 Many hedgers in fact were unable to meet the in-
creased requirements and took losses on their contracts.282 
Exchange officials point to such confusion as a reason why 
margins must be set by the exchanges, which are familiar with daily 
trading conditions, rather than by the govemment.283 They also 
maintain that the only legitimate purpose of futures margins is to 
protect FCM's from losses that could be caused by unsecured debit 
balances in customers' accounts.284 Accordingly, the exchanges argue 
that federal supervision is unwarranted. They reject any analogy to 
securities margins, which may be adjusted by the Federal Reserve 
Board,285 because in contrast to the level of securities margins, the 
level of futures margins is allegedly of little direct importance to 
the rest of the economy.286 Margins should thus be set as low as 
possible while still ensuring performance of contract commit-
ments.287 Exchanges favor low margins because high margins force 
hedgers to borrow more funds, and thereby to incur higher costs. 
Since costs are passed along to consumers, the public has an interest 
in low margin rates.28B 
Many of these arguments are indisputable. The conclusion to 
which they lead, however, may be challenged. Even accepting the: 
assumption that the only function of margins is to protect FCM's, it 
does not follow that federal authorities have no valid regulatory 
objectives. Federal regulation seeks to ensure the existence of fair 
and open markets in which investors can have confidence; credit 
protection is surely an important part of this goal. Especially in 
281. Id. at 19-21. 
282. See House Small Business Hearings, supra note 38, at 21. 
283. See, e.g., 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 318, 493-94. 
284. See, e.g., id. at 318, 447, 493. 
285. Securities margin levels determine the proportion between the amount that 
is actually paid for securities and the amount that may be borrowed for their pur-
chase. The Federal Reserve has authority to determine this proportion because margin 
levels provide a device by which to control credit and money supply for the economy. 
Because purchasers of futures contracts buy future obligations rather than shares 
representing the ownership of actual assets, the exchanges argue that futures margin 
changes have no effect on the nation's money supply. See 1974 Senate Hearings, supra 
note 37, at 493. 
For comparisons of the functions of futures margins and securities margins, see 
ECONOMIC R.E5EARCH SERVICE, U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, MARGINS, SPECULATION AND 
PRICES IN GRAIN FUTURES MARKETS 157-73 (1967) [hereinafter 1967 MARGIN STUDY]; R. 
TEWELES, C. HAiu.ow & H. STONE, supra note 6, at 14, 45-51; 1974 Senate Hearings, 
supra, at 447 (testimony of F. Rhodes, President, New York Cotton Exchange); id. at 
493 (appendix to statement of C. Chapin, representing the New York Coffee &: Sugar 
Exchange, the New York Cocoa Exchange, and The Commodity Exchange, Inc.). 
286. See note 285 supra. 
287. See 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 414 (statement of A. Donahoo, 
Executive Vice-President, Minneapolis Grain Exchange, Minneapolis, Minn.). 
288. See, e.g., id. at 447 (statement of F. Rhodes, President, New York ·cotton 
Exchange); id. at 494 (appendix to statement of C. Chapin). 
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times of high prices and volatile markets reflecting food shortages 
and inflation,289 the risks created by inadequate safeguards on market 
credit are great. Problems are most likely to arise on the smaller 
exchanges, which occasionally attempt to attract business by setting 
low margin levels. Federal regulatory authority is necessary to pre-
vent dangerously low margins from leading to serious financial 
losses for brokerage houses or even to the collapse of an exchange. 
Federal oversight of margin requirements would also help to 
control speculation. The exchanges argue against this proposition,200 
citing a 1966 study of futures margins done for the Department of 
Agriculture.291 They present the study as evidence that speculation 
often moderates price volatility, and that raising margins in order 
to reduce speculation will actually harm hedgers, without reducing 
market movements.292 
The results of the 1966 study are not nearly as conclusive as the 
exchanges suggest. It is not clear that margin levels could not be 
used to control speculation. In its final recommendations, the study 
does suggest that federal interference in setting margin levels would 
be unwise.293 This recommendation is based in part on evidence 
that small increases in margin levels have tended to correspond with 
increased market volatility.294 The study cautioned, however, that 
the correlation may have occurred because the margin increases 
were made when greater fluctuations were expected, or because 
many brokers did not comply with the changes in margins, which 
the exchanges were lax in enforcing. If the federal authorities had 
enforced the margin changes, the study noted, the results might 
have been different.295 Furthermore, in the one instance when large 
increases in margin requirements were made, there was a prompt 
reduction in price fluctuations.296 And, as the study points out, it 
is only when major margin changes are needed that federal au-
thorities are likely to intervene.297 
In properly evaluating the study's recommendation against fed-
eral oversight of margins, it is important to remember that the study 
289. See, e.g., Thackray, The Perilous Present for Commodity Futures, MONEY, 
Aug. 1973, at 28; Bus. WEEK, Dec. 22, 1973, at 118; FORBES, Aug. l, 1973, at 25; 
FORTUNE, July 1973, at 65; TIME, April 2, 1973, at 84. 
290, See 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 337 (testimony of L Melamed, 
Chairman, International Money Market, Chicago Mercantile Exchange); id. at 493 
(testimony of C. Chapin). 
291. See 1967 MARGIN STUDY, supra note 285. 
292. See 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 493 (appendix to statement of 
C. Chapin). 
293. 1967 l\:fARGIN SruoY, supra note 285, at 8. 
294. Id. at 191-93. 
295. Id. at 192-93. 
296. Id. at 142-43. 
297. Id. at 194. 
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was addressing regulation by the Commodity Exchange Authority 
as of 1966. The report concluded that prompt, accurate determina-
tions of when to apply margin controls to moderate excessive price 
fluctuations would require "highly sophisticated systems of market 
data collection and tabulation .... "298 Such systems were not avail-
able to the Authority in 1966. In light of the tremendous increase 
in the amount and the sophistication of the data that ·will be avail-
able to the new Commission,299 the current import of the report 
must be questioned. New, detailed studies of the impact of changes 
in margins on controlling excessive speculation must be undertaken 
before the Commis~ion is permanently deprived of regulatory au-
thority in this area. 
A final argument against federal oversight raised by the ex-
changes is that proper margins are so essential to the markets that 
unwise federal intervention could "effectively destroy futures 
trading .... "300 Exchange officials should set margins, the argument 
goes, because they are closest to the trading floor and their knowl-
edge and experience makes them best able to weigh the interests 
of the diverse groups affected by margin levels.301 Federal authorities 
would be too remote to make quick and accurate decisions.802 
This argument ignores the potential conflicts of interest that 
may arise if exchanges are free to set margin levels without federal 
oversight. The boards of most exchanges are dominated by repre-
sentatives of FCM's and floor traders,303 and it is the board that sets 
margin levels. Because margin changes can be used to raise or lower 
commodity prices,804 there may be a conflict between the public 
responsibilities of exchange directors and their personal interests 
in price movements. For this reason some have actually demanded 
that federal authorities oversee all exchange margin decisions.305 
The majority sentiment, however, would leave the day-to-day setting 
of margin levels to the exchanges. Thus, most recent legislative 
298. Id. at 9. 
299. See, e.g., FUTURES DATA REPORT, supra note 113. 
300. 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 493 (testimony of C. Chapin, repre-
senting the New York Coffee & Sugar Exchange, the New York Cocoa Exchange, and 
The Commodity Exchange, Inc.). 
301. See, e.g., 1973 House Hearings, supra note 50, at 70 (testimony of A. Donahoo, 
Secretary, Minneapolis Grain Exchange); id. at 93 (testimony of H. Christopher, 
President, The Board of Trade of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc.); House Small Business 
Hearings, supra note 38, at 162-63 (testimony of F. Uhlmann, Chairman, Board of 
Trade of the City of Chicago). 
302, See 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 453, 493-94. 
303. Interview with Edward De Moch, Commodity Market Specialist, Associated 
Press, in Chicago, July 26, 1973. See also note 159 supra. 
304. See 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 339 (testimony of L. Melamed, 
Chairman, International Monetary Market, Chicago Mercantile Exchange). 
305. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 93-963, supra note 142, at 21; 1974 Senate Hearings, 
supra note 37, at 208-09 (testimony of Representative Smith). 
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proposals have given federal authorities only minimal oversight 
functions. 306 
There are some steps that federal authorities might take to 
guarantee adequate margins that would not involve federal deter-
mination of margin amounts. One such measure would change the 
manner in which clearing members' margin deposits with the ex-
change clearing houses are computed. Currently, initial margin 
deposits are requested of clearing members only for their net long 
or short position in a commodity.BOT Thus, a clearing member firm 
that has both a short position-for the sale of 50 May com futures 
contracts-and a long position-for the purchase of 100 May com 
contracts-would be required to deposit margin money only on its 
net long position of 50 May com futures contracts. Since the firm 
will be owed margin money from both its long and its short cus-
tomers, but need pay only on its net position, it may be la.'{ in 
determining the reliability of its customers and in requiring them 
to keep minimum margin amounts on hand.Bos Because of this prac-
tice, firms will often wait some time before liquidating the con-
tracts of a delinquent customer who has lost on the market. 
A preferable system would require clearing members to deposit 
margins on both their long and short positions with the clearing 
house. Such a requirement would encourage greater caution on the 
part of FCM's in dealing with their customers,Boo especially in this 
period of high prices and costly market fluctuations.B10 To minimize 
federal intrusion, the authority to tighten margin requirements in 
this manner might be made discretionary rather than mandatory. 
Another way for the Commission to supervise margin levels 
without interfering directly in their determination would be to 
develop a general margin formula. Some have suggested that careful 
study would reveal that safe margin levels are functions of prices 
and trading conditions.B11 The Commission, in cooperation with the 
exchanges, could develop margin tables that would specify acceptable 
margin spreads according to price level, price volatility, trading 
306. See, e.g., H.R. 11788, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 13 (1966); S. 2578, 93d Cong., 1st 
Sess. § 11 (1973); S. 2837, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 201 (1973). See also 1974 Senate Hear-
ings, supra note 37, at 453. 
307. See CmCAGO 130ARD OF TRADE, supra note 204, at 31. 
308. Radin Interview, supra note 245. 
309. Radin Interview, supra note 245. Radin also noted that such a system would 
prevent the possibility of an account executive or back office employee hiding his 
own transactions against the company's net position. Id. See also Wall St. J., Oct. 23, 
1974, at 9, col. 2 (midwest ed.). 
310. See materials cited note 289 supra. 
311. See, e.g., 1973 House Hearings, supra note 50, at 48-49 (testimony of R, 
Richards, representing the National Grain &: Feed Association); id. at 76 (testimony 
of A. Donahoo, Secretary, Minneapolis Grain Exchange); Interim Report of the Comp• 
troller General on Commodity Futures Trading, May 3, 1974, in 1974 Senate Hear• 
ings, supra note 37, at 1~9. 
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volume, and other
0 
significant factors.312 Such tables need not be 
binding on the exchanges, and particular conditions might require 
deviations from them. However, they would provide a general guide 
that could at least help hedgers anticipate their margin costs and 
signal authorities as to unusual margin requirements. 
In addition to these measures, the Commission should request 
authority to intervene in margin determination in times of unusual 
market stress or volatility.313 The mere possibility of action by fed-
eral regulators will encourage exchanges to cooperate with federal 
regulators and to maintain adequate credit safeguards. Although 
exchange officials have argued that federal regulators might use 
such authority unnecessarily,314 this argument has little merit. The 
1974 Act expressly provides that the new Commissioners shall in-
clude persons knowledgeable about futures trading.315 It seems 
unlikely that such individuals would use their authority without 
reason. 
VJ. CONCLUSION 
When legislation is enacted that delegates difficult decisions to 
a regulatory body, its ultimate success depends on that body's inter-
pretation of its mandate. Such is the case with the 1974 Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission Act. The choices before the Com-
mission are not easy. While its first task must be to gather better 
and more complete information, at some point the Commission 
must make use of its new decision-making authority. If the Com-
missioners choose to rely on the familiar industry shibboleths of 
futures regulation, their increased authority will mean little. If, 
instead, they take a fresh approach, they may be plagued by their 
lack of authority in some areas. Their· effectiveness will depend on 
their skill in exploring new alternatives, both in those areas opened 
to them by the new Act and in those still not within their power. 
312. See 1973 House Hearings, supra note 50, at 48. 
313. It has been suggested that federal authorities should intervene in settiiig 
margin levels only when there are particular proble.ms to be solved, and when radical 
changes in margin setting procedure or margin levels are necessary. 1967 MARGIN 
STUDY, supra note 285, at 193-94. 
314. See, e.g., 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 453 (testimony of F. Rhodes, 
President, New York Cotton Exchange). 
315. Pub. L. No. 93-463, § 101, 88 Stat. 1389. 
